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INTRODUCTION 
It has become a commonplace none the less accurate for that, to 
say that Daubert v. Merrill Dow1 precipitated a revolution in the law of 
expert evidence,2 the endpoint and exact contours of which are not 
yet fully worked out.  Nevertheless, it is becoming increasingly clear 
that this revolution is changing the practical realities and results of 
trial in many cases or classes of cases in which various sorts of 
expertise play a central role.  This is currently most obvious in regard 
to toxic tort and products liability claims,3 but potentially the effects 
of the revolution will almost certainly be felt in a much broader range 
of cases, including all those criminal prosecutions in which claimed 
expertise plays a substantial role in the outcome. 
As the revolution unfolds, it raises serious issues along a number 
of axes.4  All of these threads of controversy are interdependent, and 
 
 1 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 2 See, e.g., David L. Faigman, The Law’s Scientific Revolution: Reflections and 
Ruminations on the Law’s Use of Experts in Year 7 of the Revolution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 662 (2000); Thomas R. Freeman, Guardians at the Gate, 24 L.A. LAW. 26, 28 
(2001) (referring to the movement as “the Daubert revolution”); Marc S. Klein, The 
Revolution in Practice and Procedure: Daubert Hearings, 1 SHEPPARD’S EXPERT & SCI. 
EVID. Q. 655 (1994); Brian C. Murchison, Treating Physicians as Expert Witnesses in 
Compensation Systems: The Public Health Connection, 90 KY. L.J. 891, 917 (2001-02) 
(referring to the “the Daubert revolution”); Joseph Sanders, Shari S. Diamond & Neil 
Vidmar, Legal Perceptions of Science and Expert Knowledge, 8 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 
139, 142 (2002) (same). 
 3 Daubert has led to a rise in summary judgments against plaintiffs in tort cases in 
federal court resulting from exclusion of proffered expert evidence.  See LLOYD 
DIXON & BRANDON GILL, CHANGES IN THE STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE 
IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES 56 (2001).  Half of those summary judgments involved 
exclusion of evidence regarding the cause of the plaintiff’s injury.  Id.  This is the 
hallmark of the toxic tort case.  In absolute numbers, the plurality of the cases were 
classified as products liability cases.  Id. at 21, tbl. 3.3.  On the criminal side, with a 
couple of notable exceptions, Daubert has had very little impact.  See D. Michael 
Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the 
Dock, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 149 (2000) [hereinafter Risinger, Navigating Expert 
Reliability]. 
 4 These include: (1) the role of the judge versus the role of the jury in jury trials; 
(2) the ideal of a uniform standard for establishing the preconditions of evidence 
admissibility versus the impact of such low standards on the broader promises 
represented by the case standard of proof as a whole; (3) the tenability of the claim 
that judicial evaluation of evidentiary sufficiency adequately resolves questions of low 
standards of admissibility when applied to claimed expertise; (4) judicial competency 
to evaluate claims of expertise versus judicial deference to expert communities on 
the validity of such claims; (5) the ideal of faith in juries to handle and evaluate 
mixed information more satisfactorily than any other institutional arrangement for 
dispute resolution versus profound suspicion that there are broad categories of 
information (claimed expertise among them), that juries cannot be expected to 
evaluate well; (6) loose standards for the scope of an expert’s claimed expertise 
versus tight standards for scope of expertise; (7) concern that like cases be treated 
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no satisfactory, full examination of the evolving law of expert 
evidence can fail to touch on each of these issues.  However, different 
foci will yield different insights, and in this Article we focus on the 
question of how a court is to go about the task of framing the issue to 
which standards of reliability will be applied in the individual case.  
This framing process directly implicates the issues of decisional 
specificity and generality and their interconnection with the uses and 
abuses of discretion and precedent. 
As a preliminary matter, it is interesting to note that this 
revolution was anything but inevitable.  If one examines the record of 
the federal district courts from the passage of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence to the decision in Daubert, one sees at first more or less what 
one would expect to see:5 for the first decade or so, opinions putter 
along generally in the expected and usual way, with few reliability 
challenges to proffered expertise6 worth the label.7  Then, around 
 
alike versus normal notions of appellate deference to trial courts on rulings of 
evidentiary admissibility; (8) concern that different cases be treated differently versus 
a systemic interest of all judges in disposing of foundational issues regarding 
expertise on broad grounds so as to be spared by precedent from having to 
repeatedly consider the asserted reliability of various sub- and sub- sub-expertises in a 
potentially very great number of cases. 
 5 This was accomplished by piggybacking on the research and research strategy 
of the Rand study, DIXON & GILL, supra note 3.  In order to generate pre-Daubert data 
on how federal district courts handled challenges to expertise in civil cases, the Rand 
researchers used a Westlaw search with a 27-term search string which was 
overinclusive but unlikely to exclude any such challenge.  Id. at 17.  This string 
generated 4097 hits from December 31, 1979 through June 1999.  A random one-
third (1345) of those cases were examined by “coders,” who were law students or 
recent law graduates who had been trained to evaluate the opinions in regard to 
whether they involved challenges to the admission of expert testimony on reliability 
grounds in civil cases.  Id.  Their examination  produced 399 cases which in their 
judgment involved such challenges.  Of those, 163 were decided before Daubert.  Id. 
at 20, tbl. 3.2.  We contacted Dr. Dixon, and he graciously supplied us with a list of 
those 163 cases.  We then examined them ourselves.  It turns out that we found that 
we had some disagreement with the Rand raters as to the characterization of some of 
the cases.  At any rate, the assertions in the text are based on our re-examination of 
that set of 163 cases, plus those turned up when we extended the search back to the 
effective date of the Federal Rules of Evidence (January 1, 1975), a sample universe 
large enough to yield confident insights. 
 6 The Rand search string turns up a total of about 70-75 cases a year of all types 
until 1985, when the number jumps to 96, followed by 136 in 1986, and 154 in 1987, 
with that trend continuing thereafter. 
 7 One of our major disagreements with the Rand raters concerns various 
decisions which they treated as reliability decisions which we do not regard as such.  
The largest such category involves persons proffered as experts who were called upon 
to give what were essentially legal opinions.  This was the largest single category in 
the set of pre-Daubert cases (23 cases, or 14 percent of the total), resulting in 19 
exclusions, or nearly a third of all exclusions.  While courts are not always scrupulous 
in guarding the line between legal conclusions and other kinds of statements, a fair 
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mid-1985, things begin to take off,8 with serious issues of expert 
reliability becoming hotter and hotter.  However, these challenges, 
with their attendant dispute and controversy, are largely 
concentrated in one type of case dealing with one issue—the type of 
case and issue involved in Daubert itself—that we may style “risk 
increase” causation in toxic tort.9  Even before the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in the Daubert case, lower courts had stripped the 
“novel” requirement out of the Frye test in such cases, holding that 
Federal Rule of Evidence 70210 required general acceptance at least of 
the methodology employed in the generation of all expert evidence 
assertedly based on science when such evidence was proffered on the 
issue of causation in toxic tort cases.11  In addition, many of the lower 
court opinions contained language even more Daubert-like than this 
regarding reliability in general.12 
When these issues (in particular the role of “general 
acceptance”) were finally faced by the Supreme Court itself, it was not 
at all obvious that the Court would go beyond fashioning a doctrine 
 
proportion of courts have always rejected such testimony, and done so on the basis of 
role, not reliability.  We do not take these cases to deal with “reliability” in the Daubert 
sense. 
 8 The number of cases hit by the Rand search string held between 32 and 43 for 
every six-month period from 1980 until the second half of 1985, when it jumped to 
53 and accelerated from there.  It is almost as if Judge Weinstein’s opinion in In re 
“Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), 
triggered the rise.  See id. at 1275-76, 1285 (excluding expert testimony on the causal 
link between various complaints of Vietnam veterans and their exposure to the 
defoliant Agent Orange after a Daubert-like analysis, and granting summary judgment 
for the defendants).  However, the Agent Orange case was not the first Daubert 
precursor.  That award must go to Judge Becker’s opinion while a district court judge 
in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Pa. 1981), 
which excluded various proffered expertise on reliability grounds and then granted 
summary judgment.  This decision was later reversed by the Third Circuit per Judge 
Gibbons in In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 
1983).  The collision of viewpoints between Judge Becker and Judge Gibbons 
prefigured many of the controversial Daubert issues to come. 
 9 See, e.g., Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 646 F. Supp. 1420 (E.D. Tex. 1986) 
(excluding treating physician on issue of causal link between plaintiff’s damages and 
exposure to herbicide).  There are 24 such cases, two-thirds of which resulted in 
exclusion. 
 10 Hereinafter in the text Federal Rule of Evidence 702 will be referred to as 
“FRE 702,” or simply “Rule 702.”  We regard the abbreviation “Fed. R. Evid.” as 
clumsy and as interrupting flow when used in text. 
 11 See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Cal. 1989) 
(deciding on lack of general acceptance grounds without reference to novelty). 
 12 See Mendes-Silva v. United States, No. 89-1131 (RCL), 1991 WL 135090 (D.D.C. 
July 12, 1991).  In Mendes-Silva, one party’s experts claimed that vaccine-induced 
encephalopathy had been caused by yellow fever vaccine.  The court rejected the 
proffered experts and provided a good summary of the tides of federal judicial 
opinion on expert reliability as of the date of the opinion. 
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that was limited to the recurring problems of that narrow band of 
cases.  Nor was it certain that the Court’s doctrine would go beyond 
explicitly “scientific” evidence, a limitation which would have had the 
imprimatur of tradition, and which would have covered all potential 
proffers of expert testimony on the issue of risk increase induced by 
exposure to a claimed toxic substance.  However, as we all know, at 
least by now, this the Court did not do.  Instead, Justice Blackmun 
fashioned an opinion which, although addressed mainly to a view of 
the right way to judge reliability in the context of evidence claiming 
the mantle of science, was firmly based on a construction of FRE 702 
which was not so limited, but broader and trans-substantive, requiring 
by its logic some threshold reliability determination for all proffered 
expertise.13 
At first, litigants and lower courts were divided on whether the 
Supreme Court had actually intended what it had apparently implied 
in those passages of the opinion.14  Finally, Kumho Tire v. Carmichael15 
laid to rest all residual doubt about the breadth of the change in 
approach being mandated, but left unclear many questions about 
how the new enhanced gatekeeping approach was to operate in 
differing contexts.  In order to approach these questions with 
appropriate caution, it is perhaps advisable to start from the bottom 
up. 
DANGERS AND DIFFICULTIES OF EXPERTISE IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 
THAT USES JURIES 
Our legal notions about how to approach information for 
purposes of doing justice and resolving disputes are inextricably 
bound up with the institution of the jury, even in non-jury contexts.16  
 
 13 The Court in Daubert said as much: “Rule 702 . . . clearly contemplates some 
degree of regulation of the subjects and theories about which an expert may testify.”  
509 U.S. at 589.  But the Court then limits itself to a discussion of the nature of that 
gatekeeping responsibility “in the scientific context because that is the nature of the 
expertise offered here.”  Id at 590 n.8.  A functionally similar gatekeeping 
responsibility for proffers of expertise not based on science would seem to follow, 
and, in the event, did. 
 14 Compare, e.g., Iocobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 
1994) (stating that Daubert validity analysis applies only to scientific evidence), with 
Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d (6th Cir. 1994) (explaining that Daubert gatekeeping 
and validity requirements apply to all expert testimony). 
 15 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 16 Professor Damaska sees the three institutional variables that condition the 
characteristic details of Anglo-American proof law (the “pillars carrying common law 
evidence”) as being the organization of the trial court (most notably the split-
function jury system), the temporal concentration of proceedings (the “day in court” 
model of the trial that starts and runs until it is finished), and party control (the 
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By accident, or by some process that might be said to embody at least 
some sort of design, our British forebears and ourselves evolved a 
decisional system which displays some useful attributes of more 
specifically purpose-built systems in other areas of endeavor.  The 
most important of these attributes for this Article (and perhaps 
generally) is the creation of a two-stage split-function system in which 
the first decision-maker (the judge) controls the information 
available to the second decision maker (the jury), thus making 
possible masking and bias filtration.17  The filtration is functionally 
analogous to that which has become a norm of the scientific method 
in the last half century.18  This system, in turn, makes it necessary to 
determine by what standards a judge should perform this general 
“gatekeeping” function in an adversary system. 
A general consideration of this topic is of course beyond the 
scope of this Article.  However, it will serve present purposes to 
observe that a number of competing interests come to bear on the 
issue.  The collision of these interests has resulted in two general 
positions regarding proper standards of gatekeeping, positions which 
are at odds with each other and are imperfectly reconciled in both 
theory and practice.  We might call these the “when in doubt, let it 
in” principle and the “when in doubt, keep it out” principle.19  They 
 
adversary system).  See MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 125 (1997).  While 
these are logically separable, in that one could, at least in theory, utilize a jury 
without a separate judge, and one could certainly utilize a bias-filtering split function 
without a jury, have a concentrated trial without a jury, and have a dominantly party-
controlled procedure without a jury, the existence of the jury would seem to make 
the development of the other aspects more likely.  This is true even though current 
interpretations of the historical record place the development of strong adversary 
control rather late in the game, in the late eighteenth century.  See T.P. Gallanis, The 
Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 499 (1999); Stephen Landsman, The Rise 
of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth Century England, 75 CORNELL L. 
REV. 497 (1990); John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View 
from the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1197-1202 (1996). 
 17 See Allen D. Allen, Scientific Versus Judicial Factfinding in the United States, SMC-2 
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS 548-50 (1972).  Professor 
Damaska makes the point that it is this split function that makes the notion of 
“admissibility” even intelligible.  Mirjan Damaska, Of Hearsay and Its Analogues, 76 
MINN. L. REV. 425, 455-56 (1992). 
 18 See D. Michael Risinger, Michael J. Saks, William C. Thompson & Robert 
Rosenthal, The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: 
Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 9 (2002) [hereinafter 
Risinger et al., Observer Effects]. 
 19 One might say that this tension is best symbolized by Rule 403’s requirement 
that probative value be “substantially” outweighed by prejudicial effect before 
exclusion results on the one hand, and by Rule 104’s general position that the 
burden is on the proponent of evidence to make out its admissibility.  In Kumho Tire, 
the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the general burden is on the proponent, but 
indicated that the opponent has an obligation to point out why there is a reason to 
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represent different resolutions of issues about the role of parties and 
judges in an adversary system, the competence and trustworthiness of 
juries, and the role of rationality in legal decision-making. 
To put this in context, it is necessary to say a bit more about the 
notion of an adversary system and the contrasting alternative, an 
“inquisitorial” system.20  An adversary system is one in which the 
decisions about how contested disputes are to be presented to the 
ultimate decision-maker are left in the hands of the disputing parties.  
In an inquisitorial system21 (not a very apt label, but too embedded to 
be changed here), these same decisions are all made by a decision-
maker who is at least formally neutral between the parties, and who 
may or may not also be the ultimate decision-maker on the merits of 
the dispute. 
For all the rhetoric that is sometimes thrown up in defense of 
“our adversary system,”22 no one argues in favor of a pure adversary 
system for the simple reason that such a pure system, like direct 
democracy, could not function except under exceedingly rare 
conditions.  This is because a pure adversary system would have no 
judge, in the sense we are accustomed to.  The parties would be free 
to present whatever they themselves determined to be helpful to their 
cause, and the party with the weakest case could filibuster 
indefinitely, like a member of the Senate reading from a telephone 
book, limited only by expense and endurance.23  For this reason at 
 
doubt the proffer’s admissibility, to call its admissibility “sufficiently into question”  
before the court is obliged to make any determination.  526 U.S. at 149, 152-53.  This 
further obscures the default position and heightens the tension between the two 
approaches.  Improper reversal of the burden of showing admissibility in the face of 
serious challenge is one of the common tactics which courts have adopted to arrive at 
“light-touch” treatment of prosecution-proffered expertise in criminal cases.  See 
Michael J. Saks, The Legal and Scientific Evaluation of Forensic Science, 33 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1167 (2003). 
 20 By far the most sophisticated and influential writer in English on these issues, 
both from a descriptive and a normative perspective, is Professor Damaska, starting 
with Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal 
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506 (1973), and culminating in 
DAMASKA, supra note 16. 
 21 See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 126-28 (2d ed. 1985); see 
also Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414 (1952) (contrasting the rise of 
the English adversary system with what Ladd took to be the “inquisitorial” function of 
the jury at an earlier time). 
 22 As of February 2003, this cliché phrase generated 956 hits in the Westlaw 
Journals database (JLR, as it is designated). 
 23 Wigmore claimed that something approaching this existed among some 
African tribes.  JOHN H. WIGMORE, A KALEIDOSCOPE OF JUSTICE 728 (1941).  Even in 
such a system, there would in most cases be a practical pressure not to try the 
patience of the ultimate decisionmaker too much with proffers lacking any apparent 
bearing on the dispute, lest this be held against you when decision time finally came. 
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least, one would expect little disagreement that such a pure 
adversarial system would be undesirable and that there must at least 
be some judge-administered standards of relevance which will both 
structure and limit the parties’ freedom to proffer material and 
oblige the ultimate decision-maker to wade through it.24  In addition, 
most would probably agree that this would apply even when the 
parties themselves, for whatever their reasons, would be content to 
reciprocally drown the decision-maker in mountains of information 
of peripheral (or no) relevance to the issues that the applicable 
substantive law defines as the material issues of the dispute.  Although 
it is sometimes said broadly that there is party autonomy to make the 
rules of evidence for the individual case by agreement or failure to 
object,25 there is at least a time-efficiency interest which belongs to the 
dispute resolution system itself that vests the judge with authority to 
cut off such proffers. 
Beyond this minimum, the more pure adversaryists would begin 
to dig in their heels.  They would say that truth best emerges in the 
clash of self-interested parties packaging whatever relevant 
information is available26 in the most persuasive way they can, that 
juries are (because they are not repeat players and are a group with a 
range of life experiences to bring to bear in evaluating the meaning 
of information) the best possible decision mechanism to handle all 
types of relevant information, and that, essentially, the system would 
work best if there were no rules of evidence beyond a weak relevance 
check.27 
Adversary skeptics have a different view.28  While few, if any (at 
 
 24 “Courts are so organized that there must be some limit to the facts which may 
be given in evidence, as there must be an end of litigation.”  BURR W. JONES, THE LAW 
OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES 3 (1896). 
 25 See DAMASKA, supra note 16, at 87. 
 26 This Article’s text has concentrated on aspects of adversary control of the 
presentation of information, mainly because the Article is about judging the reliability 
of proffers of expert testimony.  One of the most powerful criticisms of an adversary 
system, however, is that it leaves both the gathering and presentation of information 
to partisan adversaries, and this may result in the non-presentation of important 
information.  This situation is exacerbated by limitations on information-sharing, 
especially in the criminal context.  See DAMASKA, supra note 16 at 98-101; see also ALVIN 
I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD 300-04 (1999). 
 27 For a description of this position, see Dale A. Nance, Reliability and Admissibility 
of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 191 (2003).  As Professor Nance notes: “[T]he locus 
classicus for this argument is Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON 
AMERICAN LAW 34 (Harold J. Berman ed., 1961).”  Id. at 195 n.13; see also GOLDMAN, 
supra note 26, at 296. 
 28 For a careful examination of the arguments concerning the relation of 
partisan adversary control to the truth-seeking function, see DAMASKA, supra note 16, 
at 74-103, and GOLDMAN, supra note 26, at 295-300.  See also JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON 
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least in our legal culture), would advocate judicial gathering and 
winnowing of dispute-relevant information and its presentation to the 
ultimate decision-maker in edited and summary form with no input 
from or consultation with the parties, adversary skeptics press two 
kinds of arguments in favor of heavy judicial and rule-structured 
control of what is given to the jury: adversary excess and jury 
weakness in dealing with certain kinds of information.29  The two 
arguments dovetail.  If juries can be persuaded to abandon reason or 
overvalue certain information, advocates will not only not hesitate to 
do it,30 they will arguably have an obligation to do it on behalf of their 
clients.31  Upon reflection, there appear to be certain commonsense 
classes of information that are subject to such abuse, such as hearsay 
or “character” evidence.  We must both authorize and require judges 
to filter such information.32 
The formal rules of evidence give judges plenty of authority to 
filter what the judge determines to be iatrogenic information and to 
exclude it.33  However, the long tradition of the system, at least in the 
last century, favors judicial restraint except in areas of mandated 
categorical exclusion.34  What the Daubert and Kumho Tire decisions 
 
TRIAL 82-87 (1949); MARVIN FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980); Warren Berger, 
Agenda for 2000 A.D.—A Need for Systematic Anticipation, Address at the National 
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (Apr. 7-
9, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 79, 83-96 (1976); Steven Landsman, Who Needs Evidence Rules, 
Anyway?, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 635 (1992); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the 
Adversary System in a Post-Modern, Multi-Cultural World, 1 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL 
ETHICS 49 (1996); Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the 
Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729 (1906), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273 (1964); 
Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 403 (1992). 
 29 DAMASKA, supra note 16, at 84. 
 30 It is adversary excess—“the old razzle dazzle,” in the terms of the recent 
depiction of the trial system in the Academy Award winning motion picture 
“Chicago”—that undermines many of the arguments which are sometimes made 
concerning the desirability of “informational completeness,” and the claim that rules 
of exclusion underestimate and disrespect juries.  It is not what juries would do with 
information in a vacuum, but rather what lawyers will do to juries using the 
information, that justifies rules of exclusion. 
 31 See the obligation of zealous representation reflected in the ABA Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct.  See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 
(2003) (requiring the lawyer to act with “zeal in advocacy”). 
 32 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404, 801, 802. 
 33 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (providing leeway even in the face of the word 
“substantially”).  The term “iatrogenic” was originally a medical term meaning 
“caused by the physician” and refers to a situation made worse by attempts to 
improve it.  By extension, it is a very useful word in regard to proof rules of various 
kinds that on balance do more veritistic harm than good. 
 34 This is perhaps best represented symbolically by the requirement of Rule 403 
that probative value be “substantially outweighed” by prejudicial effect before a judge 
  
24 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:015 
did was to move expert evidence generally from the area of “light 
touch control” and party autonomy to the area of heavier judicial 
evaluation and control, in the name of “reliability.” 
So what’s so wrong with unreliable expertise anyhow?  The 
commonsense fear is that factfinders will defer to the unreliable 
expert and treat the unreliable expert’s testimony as reliable.  One 
could respond that this danger exists in regard to all evidence.  
However, at least as to fact witness testimony, and various forms of 
documentary, physical, or circumstantial proof, the assumption is 
that average people have developed, through the process of living in 
society, sufficient knowledge about the world of humans and its 
workings that they have a fair chance to evaluate and accurately 
weigh and discount information coming from such familiar sources.  
Problems of misleading specialized social context are dealt with by 
having a group of factfinders from across a range of social 
backgrounds and experiences (that is, a jury), one or more of whom 
it is hoped will be familiar with the specialized context from living in 
it in their ordinary lives.  Whatever the empirical realities of that 
assumption,35 it becomes increasingly tenuous as the information 
presented to the factfinder becomes more and more removed from 
any socially common experience.36  And such claims of specialized 
knowledge or skill beyond common experience are the essence of 
asserted expertise.37 
THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO EXPERT RELIABILITY 
As previously noted, at least until what we might call the run-up 
period immediately preceding Daubert, judges were not compelled by 
doctrine and rarely undertook in practice to evaluate the asserted 
warrant to believe claims of expertise directly, in the terms put forth 
by the practitioners of the claimed expertise.  In those days of “light 
touch” evaluation, about all that was generally required was that the 
proposed testimony be facially relevant, usually by virtue of some 
conclusion (“opinion”) put forth by the putative expert, and that the 
 
should exclude evidence proffered by a party, a signal not to indulge too fine an 
exclusionary instinct to which most judges adhere even in fairly extreme 
circumstances.  See D. Michael Risinger, John Henry Wigmore, Johnny Lynn Old Chief and 
“Legitimate Moral Force”—Keeping the Courtroom Safe for “Heartstrings and Gore,” 49 
HASTINGS L.J. 403, 429-31 (1998). 
 35 It only helps in regard to the common experience of significantly large 
communities in the venire pool, and even then there may be no representative of the 
salient community on a given jury where one is needed. 
 36 See GOLDMAN, supra note 26, at 308-09. 
 37 See D. Michael Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional Taxonomy of 
Expertise, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 508, 510-11 (2000) [hereinafter Risinger, Taxonomy]. 
  
2003 KUMHO TIRE AND EXPERT RELIABILITY 25 
claimed basis of the expertise not be affirmatively discredited as 
invalid in some generally known and accepted way.38  In part because 
of this low threshold of admissibility, even the concept of expertise 
itself was ill-defined and under-examined in any kind of defensible 
taxonomic detail.  About the only subcategory of expertise which was 
generally recognized was “scientific” expertise, and the demarcation 
between “scientific” and other kinds of expertise was not at all clear.39  
As a result of the famous case Frye v. United States,40 scientific expertise 
was further divided between “novel” scientific expertise and the rest, 
with only “novel” expertise being subject to any special admissibility 
consideration bearing on validity.  Non-novel “scientific” expertise 
was thrown back into the “light touch” pool along with all other 
claims of expertise. 
Even in regard to novel scientific evidence (however defined), 
judges were generally not asked to evaluate the reliability of expert 
claims in the claims’ own terms, but merely to determine if others in 
an appropriate reference community (the “pertinent field”41) 
accepted them.  Hence, judges were spared the necessity of learning 
anything about criteria that might be applied to evaluate reliability 
directly, instead merely trusting whatever reference community was 
chosen to properly select and apply such criteria.  And for everything 
in the “light touch” pool (including “non-novel” “scientific” 
expertise), facial relevance and minimum plausibility, backed by 
commercial respectability, remained the only conditions of 
admissibility.42 
This is not to say that there were not some judges who were 
more aggressive than the average in attempting to filter out 
unreliable expertise of whatever stripe.  In so doing, they sometimes 
used a tool which, though somewhat indirect, has important 
analogues in, and implications for, current practice: definition of the 
scope of a particular individual’s expertise.43  Defining the 
 
 38 D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux & Michael J. Saks, Exorcism of Ignorance 
as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification “Expertise,” 
137 U. PA. L. REV. 731, 766-67 (1989) [hereinafter Risinger et al., Exorcism]. 
 39 Risinger, Taxonomy, supra note 37, at 509. 
 40 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 41 Id. at 1014. 
 42 David L. Faigman, Elise Porter & Michael J. Saks, Check Your Crystal Ball at the 
Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying about 
the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1803-09 (1994).  The authors 
refer to this as the “commercial marketplace” test, but the respectability of the 
market seems also to have been an important factor. 
 43 See, e.g., Globe Indem. Co. v. Highland Tank & Mfg. Co., 345 F. Supp. 1290 
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (holding that neither an electrical engineer nor an industrial 
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appropriate scope of a given person’s claimed expertise raises 
considerations which will become more generally important later in 
this Article, to wit, the relative dangers of over-generality and over-
specificity in framing such claims. 
Consider an auto mechanic who has been trained by Ford Motor 
Company to work on the engines in Taurus automobiles, and has 
worked on such engines exclusively for the last five years, since he 
completed his training.  What can we say of the scope of his expertise 
in regard to diagnosing an auto engine malfunction?  We could begin 
by saying that his only real expertise is limited to the workings of 
engines he has actually examined physically in his work.  However, 
most of us would probably agree that this is so narrow as to be both 
useless and unnecessarily grudging, even if his knowledge in regard 
to those particular engines is marginally more reliable in theory than 
that same knowledge extended to other engines we take to be 
functionally similar, because they were manufactured on the same 
assembly lines or according to the same specifications.  But if we are 
willing to grant him functionally equivalent reliability of knowledge 
in regard to the similar but not-directly-experienced engines, we have 
taken the first step in a journey with no clear endpoint.  This journey 
is in some contexts called “extension,” in others “generalization,” and 
in yet others “external validity”44 and is related to the general 
philosophical problem known as the problem of induction: how far is 
one justified in generalizing from particular instances to other things, 
either individually or represented by more general constructs such as 
categories or the hierarchically interconnected categories and 
concepts known as theories.45  To continue with our mechanic, we 
would probably be willing to grant him knowledge sufficiently 
reliable to be useful, and more reliable than that of the average 
person, in regard to—what?  All Ford engines, all automobile 
 
hygienist was qualified to testify as an expert on the design of molasses storage tank 
where neither witness had any prior experience or observational knowledge 
regarding the proper design of a molasses storage tank under the factual setting 
presented).  Defining the scope of the expert’s expertise is essentially the approach 
that Judge Becker, in United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985), 
recommended that Judge Wiener explore on remand.  Judge Becker, perhaps as a 
means of salvaging the conviction, recommended that the approach be applied to 
the proffered “weaknesses of eyewitness identification” expertise that had been 
wrongly excluded globally at trial.  This case generated the label “fit” which was later 
taken up by the Supreme Court in Daubert.  See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591.  It is possible, 
however, that the “fit” rhetoric may be ultimately traceable to Wigmore.  See infra 
note 150. 
 44 WILLIAM R. SHADISH, THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, EXPERIMENTAL 
AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR GENERALIZED CAUSAL INFERENCE 83-93 (2002). 
 45 See MICHAEL WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE 201-10 (2001). 
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engines, all gasoline-powered internal combustion reciprocating 
engines, all engines of any kind, all mechanical principles at work in 
Taurus engines?  What factors are in play when we approach such a 
problem? 
First, it seems clear that the narrower we draw the circle around 
the mechanic’s specific experience and training, the more reliable 
the allowed exercise of expertise will be (assuming any reliability in 
the first place).  However, we can draw the circle so narrowly that 
neither the allowed circle of this mechanic, or almost any other, will 
contain the problem at issue in the case to be litigated.  Drawing the 
circle too narrowly will deprive the litigant of needed expertise, not 
just from this expert, but potentially from the universe of available 
experts.  This would not be justified if the territory of the circle 
drawn a bit wider would still represent acceptable reliability and 
include the subject matter of the case at bar.  However, drawing the 
circle too broadly will give some litigants the right to present faux 
expertise to which they are not entitled. 
A large factor in deciding how broadly to draw the circle in the 
legal context would seem to be the ease of obtaining more 
appropriate and reliable expertise.  If the case at bar involves the 
workings of a Wankel rotary engine, a court might appropriately draw 
the circle narrowly, insisting on the production of a mechanic 
actually familiar with Wankel engines; however, if a plague had struck 
the international convention of Wankel engine mechanics and wiped 
them out, then it might be appropriate to draw the circle more 
broadly. 
These considerations are “best evidence” considerations, or 
perhaps, more appropriately, “better evidence” considerations.46  
 
 46 The distinction between “best evidence” requirements, and “better evidence” 
considerations applied to various decisions on admissibility, emerges from the 
interchange between Professor Imwinkelried and Professors Faigman, Kaye, Saks, 
and Sanders reflected in Edward J. Imwinkelried, Should the Courts Incorporate a Best 
Evidence Rule into the Standard Determining the Admissibility of Scientific Testimony?: 
Enough Is Enough, Even When It Is Not the Best, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 19 (1999), and 
David L. Faigman, David H. Kaye, Michael J. Saks, & Joseph Sanders, How Good Is 
Good Enough?: Expert Evidence Under Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 645 
(2000).  In contrast with Professor Imwinkelried, Professors Faigman, Kaye, Saks, and 
Sanders propose a “better evidence” principle for evaluating the admissibility of 
proffered expert testimony.  It was Professor Nance who first pointed out (and 
embraced) the extent to which the likely availability of better evidence affects 
admissibility in today’s world.  See Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA 
L. REV. 227 (1988).  In Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), the Supreme 
Court recognized a kind of “better evidence” principle when it declared that one 
important consideration in determining exclusion of prejudicial evidence under 
Rule 403 is the existence of equally probative but non-problematic evidence.  Id. at 
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Historically, the default position of most judicial practice (consistent 
with the “light touch” approach and the reliance on jury evaluation) 
seems to have been to draw the circle broadly as a matter of course 
and only narrow it as the broad definition of scope became seriously 
out of kilter in regard to exterior boundaries of specialization, and 
perhaps not even then.  For example, the nineteenth century mantra 
that “any medical man is qualified to testify upon any issue of medical 
practice” seems to still represent the formal position of many 
jurisdictions,47 although the realities of the quality of knowledge 
represented by boundaries between medical specialties ought to 
compel a rethinking, and courts are generally spared consideration 
of the “rule” by the good sense of parties in selecting experts. 
Note that to this point we have been discussing situations where 
an expert is disqualified because an issue is deemed to be outside the 
scope of her expertise but where it is assumed that there are at least 
some potential experts for whom the issue is within the scope of their 
expertise.48  Where Daubert general reliability issues and scope of 
expertise dovetail most dramatically would be when a court appears 
to rule that testimony is outside of the proffered expert’s area 
because it is beyond the state of anyone’s art, at least anyone within 
the expert’s asserted discipline. 
The practical result of the dominant twentieth century practice 
was that judges generally deferred to experts’ claims of expertise, or 
in the case of “novel scientific” evidence, pursuant to the Frye test, to 
the evaluations of those claims by other putative experts.  As already 
noted, this spared the judge from having to learn anything about the 
epistemic underpinnings of an expert’s claim to expertise, issues that 
are quite complicated and not entirely well worked out in any area of 
 
651-52.  Suffice it to say that, along with Professors Faigman, Kaye, Saks, and Sanders, 
we believe that it is proper to take into account how much better a proffer could 
have been, in determining whether it is good enough. 
 47 See generally Roy W. Fouts, The Medical Expert Witness, 19 NEB. L. BULL. 213 
(1940).  Such a position is perhaps less surprising when one considers that no 
specialization had any institutional recognition within medicine until 1933.  Id. at 
219.  McCormick stated in the 1954 first edition of his treatise that no membership in 
a specialty was required as a condition of giving medical testimony, CHARLES T. 
MCCORMICK, A HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 14, at 29 (1954), a statement 
that has survived through five editions until today, see 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 
13, at 24 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999). 
 48 See, e.g., Globe Indem. Co., 345 F. Supp. at 1291 (stating that while “[t]here are 
people in the world who would qualify to give expert testimony on this question,” the 
proffered engineer and toxicologist were insufficiently expert “regarding the proper 
formulation of safety criteria to be followed in the design of molasses tanks in this 
particular industrial setting”). 
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claimed knowledge.49  It moved the task of such evaluation, if it was 
going to be done at all, onto the plate of the jury, guided only by 
such issues as might emerge from cross-examination, or by each 
juror’s own evaluations of the reliability of the testimony (often 
based, one must suppose, on the jurors’ surface impression of the 
apparent authoritativeness of the witness and the apparent 
plausibility of any supporting explanations to which she might 
testify).  Given the difficulty of distinguishing apparent plausibility 
from validity, it is no wonder that the dominant account of the jurors’ 
usual practical role in resolving issues that have been the subject of 
expert testimony is either deferential acceptance when only one 
expert testifies, or selection between the experts as attractive persons 
and apparently authoritative figures when two experts oppose each 
other.50 
Another beneficial side effect of the “light touch” regime, from 
the judge’s perspective, was that even when a Frye-type determination 
had to be made, it was generally thought appropriate to make it in 
the broadest terms possible, or (which is the same thing) treat any 
determination of a previous judge as resolving the issue in the 
broadest terms possible.  This is well illustrated by the way in which 
bitemark identification became generally accepted as a proper 
subject for testimony in American courts.  In the first case to consider 
the issue, the 1975 California case of People v. Marx,51 the California 
court of appeals faced a very rare factual circumstance involving both 
an unusually clear bitemark and an unusually rare pattern of 
dentition.  What that court in fact did was fashion a narrow exception 
to the California version of the Frye test, allowing admission of the 
evidence in the specific instance in front of it while saying 
simultaneously: “Concededly, there is no established science of 
identifying persons from bitemarks.”52  However, as one of us has 
written before:53 
[T]hereafter the Marx case was regularly cited by courts dealing 
with much more questionable applications of bite mark 
 
 49 See Faigman et al., supra note 46, at 655-56. 
 50 Or, to be broader and more kind, the resort to “peripheral processing” 
heuristics which may include these factors.  For a summary of the available empirical 
research in regard to jury processing of expert testimony in complex cases, see 
Joseph Sanders, The Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the Admissibility of Expert 
Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 881 (2003). 
 51 126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (Ct. App. 1975). 
 52 Id. at 353. 
 53 Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability, supra note 3, at 138.  Notes 54-56 are 
retained from the original work but renumbered sequentially with those of this 
Article. 
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identification, without noting Marx’s particular facts.54  In the 
normal way that courts have worked in defining the parameters of 
admissibility for proffered expertise, Marx came to be read as a 
global warrant to admit bite mark identification evidence 
whenever a person displaying apparent credentials chose to testify 
to an identification.  Perhaps the most notorious such case was 
the very next full-scale examination of bite mark evidence, the 
Illinois case People v. Milone,55 which, relying at least in part on 
Marx, declared bite mark evidence acceptably reliable under 
much less clear conditions.56  After Marx and Milone there was 
little serious consideration given to bite mark foundational 
dependability by subsequent courts . . . . 
Such an approach yielded a judicially attractive result: a broad 
admissibility warrant resulting in effortless and time-efficient 
decisions on admissibility by invocation of precedent without any 
requirement of thought.  The fact that the broad warrant might 
authorize the admission of much that was very unreliable did not 
appear to cross the judicial mind.  In any individual case where a 
particular judge might be troubled by questions of reliability, there 
might be other tools that could be used to achieve an individually 
satisfactory result (such as manipulation of the scope of expertise 
applied in the particular case).  Or the court might salve its 
conscience by contemplating the supposed universal solvent of cross-
examination (rarely an effective solution in such cases, but what the 
heck).57  However, explicit and systematic consideration of reliability 
 
 54 See, e.g., People v. Sloane, 143 Cal. Rptr. 61, 69 (Ct. App. 1978) (relying on 
Marx to establish the general reliability of bitemark evidence). 
 55 356 N.E.2d 1350 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).  Notwithstanding the admitted 
controversy concerning the reliability of bitemark identification among forensic 
odontologists both at the trial and in the literature of the time, the Milone court 
found the Frye general acceptance standard had been met, citing Marx.  Id. at 1359-
60.  Milone remains controversial.  The defendant has been released, but continues to 
maintain his innocence and attack the bitemark evidence.  See Milone v. Camp, 22 
F.3d 693, 697 n.1 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that Milone was released after serving 
almost twenty years of his 90- to 175-year prison sentence).  In addition, there is good 
evidence that another person actually committed the murder, a person whose 
bitemarks have been judged by at least one forensic odontologist to be as good a 
match for those on the victim as Milone’s.  See id. at 700-01 (noting that the 
bitemarks found on the victim match the dentition of known serial killer Richard 
Macek and that Macek confessed to the murder several times prior to his 1987 
suicide). 
 56 See Milone, 356 N.E.2d at 1355-56, 1360 (upholding the trial court’s decision to 
allow bitemark identification testimony even though four forensic odontologists 
testified to the unreliability of such positive identification). 
 57 Compare the faith in cross examination of experts manifested in Daubert, 509 
U.S. at 593, with James M. Shellow, The Limits of Cross Examination, 34 SETON HALL L. 
REV 317 (2003). 
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generally was not a fundamental part of the job of judging. 
Daubert and its progeny have changed all that, and not just for 
the federal courts.  Evidence is accumulating that Daubert has 
changed the standards applied to expert reliability not only in states 
explicitly adopting its approach, but also in many states explicitly 
claiming to eschew it.58  Exactly how things have changed is less clear, 
however. 
KUMHO TIRE AND THE NEW REGIME OF EXPERT RELIABILITY 
GATEKEEPING 
In many ways, Kumho Tire59 is the most important of the Daubert 
trilogy, not only for making clear the Rule 702 gatekeeping 
obligation in regard to non-science “experience-based” expertise60 
(the point for which it is best known), but perhaps more importantly 
for what it says about the general construction and proper approach 
to the requirements of Rule 702 even in regard to the products of 
science.  Whether one is examining scientific expertise or not, three 
points come though clearly from Kumho Tire: First, a court must 
review the reliability of the proffered expertise specifically as it 
applies to the task for which it is being utilized in the litigation in 
which it is offered, not in some more global sense.61  Second, a court 
is obliged to think about and select the most appropriate criteria of 
reliability for the kind of expertise being proffered, given the 
circumstances of its generation in the particular case.62  The authority 
to honestly make that inquiry (and, to our minds, only that authority) 
is the essence of the “flexibility” and “discretion” referred to in the 
Kumho Tire opinion.63  Third, in regard to all expertise (even that 
 
 58 See States Move to Daubert, Even When They Say They’re Stuck on Frye, 2 EXPERT 
EVID. REP. 161 (2002). 
 59 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 60 “We conclude that Daubert’s general holding—setting forth the trial judge’s 
general gatekeeping obligation—applies not only to testimony based on ‘scientific 
knowledge,’ but also to testimony based on ‘technical’ and ‘other specialized’ 
knowledge.”  Id. at 141 
 61 This position is explained at length with extensive quotations from the Kumho 
Tire opinion in D. Michael Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand”: Non-Science Forensic 
Science after Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV 767, 773-75 (2000) 
[hereinafter Risinger, Task at Hand].  See also Joelle Anne Moreno, Beyond the Polemic 
Against Junk Science: Navigating the Oceans that Divide Science and Law with Justice Breyer 
at the Helm, 81 B.U. L. REV. 1033, 1049-60 (2001). 
 62 See Risinger, Task at Hand, supra note 61, at 774. 
 63 “The objective . . . is to ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert 
testimony.”  Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152.  The Court stated that while the relevant 
reliability inquiry “should be ‘flexible,’” the “‘overarching subject [should be] . . . 
validity’ and reliability.”  Id. at 158 (quoting with approval the opinion of the district 
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based on claims of scientific authority), while a court may consider 
the famous (or infamous) “Daubert factors,”64 the presence or absence 
of one or more is not necessarily dispositive of sufficient reliability to 
gain admission.65  What is important is the honest exposition by the 
court of an appropriately strong reason to believe that the proposed 
product of expertise was generated by a process that will generally 
yield a result sufficiently reliable so that the official ends of the proof 
system,66 will not be undermined by admission of evidence of that 
level of reliability on that kind of issue in that kind of case. 
We say that Kumho Tire “says” the above things, but the saying is 
more explicit as to some things than others.  As to the first, we believe 
that there can be no serious doubt that narrow (rather than global) 
 
court).  The Court further indicated that the inquiry should be directed toward some 
“set of reasonable reliability criteria.”  Id. 
 64 Referring to “four” factors has become standard, though the real number of 
factors is subject to debate.  The Daubert opinion spake thus, without numbering 
factors: “a key question [in regard to a theory or technique] . . . will be whether it can 
be (and has been) tested.”  509 U.S. 579, 593.  “Another pertinent consideration is 
whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication.  
Publication (which is but one element of peer review) is not a sine qua non of 
admissibility . . . .”  Id.  “Additionally, in the case of a particular scientific technique, 
the court should consider the known or potential rate of error . . . and the existence 
and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation.”  Id. at 594.  
“Finally, ‘general acceptance’ can yet have a bearing on the inquiry.”  Id.  These were 
summarized in Kumho Tire as “several factors” without numbering, but with four 
bullet points.  526 U.S. at 149-50.  However, it is easy to separate whether a claim 
“can be tested” (its empirical nature or theoretical falsifiability) and the degree to 
which it has been subjected to actual testing, into two separable but nested factors.  
In addition, the potential rate of error is arguably always 100 percent in the absence 
of some kind of testing (though not necessarily the kind of formal testing that would 
lead to more specific and quantifiable knowledge of an error rate).  Knowledge of 
error rates is thus a product of testing.  In addition, can “standards of control” for a 
technique’s operation be a relevant factor if there is no reason to believe such 
“standards” enhance reliability?  This too would seem to be a question of testing, at 
least in some contexts.  Finally, a fortiori “general acceptance” is the product of peer 
review, so one can argue that there are really eight explicitly referenced “Daubert 
factors” (falsifiability, testing, peer review, publication, potential error rate, known 
error rate, standards of practice, general acceptance) or only three (falsifiablility, 
testing which reveals error rate, peer review).  In addition, the Daubert Court invokes 
the relevance-based concept of fit, 509 U.S. at 591, which is perhaps best seen as an 
analogue to “external validity,” and which can easily be asserted as a fifth (or ninth, 
or fourth) “Daubert factor.”  See supra note 43 and infra note 70.  Courts have not 
always referred to four Daubert factors, either.  See, e.g., United States v. Crisp, 324 
F.3d 261, 266-67 (4th Cir. 2003) (five factors); United States v. Prime, 220 F. Supp. 
2d 1203, 1204 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (five factors); United States v. Griffin, 50 M.J. 278, 
284 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1999) (six factors). 
 65 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
 66 That is, the policies identified as the ends of the system in FED. R. EVID. 102 
(truth determination and justice, in the sense of proper application of law to 
accurately determined facts). 
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reliability is the explicit theme that drives the entire opinion.67  The 
second—the thoughtful selection and application of criteria—is also 
fairly explicit, given that the court makes it clear that such flexibility 
and “latitude” as it refers to is to be utilized in the service of 
determining and utilizing “reasonable measures of reliability.”68 
The third principle requires a bit more exposition, but seems to 
us a product of fairly necessary implication.  The court emphasizes 
that the “four factors” may be considered in determining the 
reliability warrant of non-scientific expertise when it would be 
reasonable to do so given the nature of the expertise under 
examination.69  The court further emphasizes (by way of reiterating a 
part of Daubert often unfortunately ignored) that the four factors 
were not each necessary conditions for a proper reliability warrant, 
nor were other factors foreclosed.70 
Thus, on our interpretation of Daubert and Kumho Tire, the 
formulation of the reliability issue in regard to proffered expert 
testimony in every case must take the form, explicitly or implicitly, of 
the following four-part question, which might be said to embody a 
different, more general, and perhaps more generally helpful, four-
factor approach than the one that has too often been mechanically 
derived from Daubert.  These may be best captured initially when set 
out in the form of a question, thus: 
In regard to any proffer of expertise, is there good reason to 
believe that the proffered product of the claimed expertise (given 
its specific form and the methods and conditions of which it is a 
product) provides the jury with appropriately reliable information 
on the case-specific question upon which the expert is proffered? 
Each of the four parts of this question must be given content-
specific consideration with regard to the individual case, but it is the 
 
 67 See Risinger, Task at Hand, supra note 61, at 774-76. 
 68 See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 153.  One should note that the Court in Daubert also 
observed that though the inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 was a flexible one, its 
“overarching subject is the scientific validity – and thus the evidentiary relevance and 
reliability – of the principles that underly a proposed submission.”  509 U.S. at 594-
95. 
 69 Id. at 150. 
 70 Id. at 151.  This is important to keep in mind when one realizes that none of 
the “four factors” addresses very specifically the criteria by which science itself would 
evaluate the belief warrant for the reliability of scientific data and its implications in 
regard to a question different from the narrow question addressed in the experiment 
or study which generated the data—questions generally referred to by the labels 
“internal validity” and “external validity.”  See infra notes 79-80.  The four factors have 
too often been deadweights woodenly applied, inert impediments to the 
development of a sophisticated approach by the courts to belief warrants for 
scientific evidence. 
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proper framing of the second and fourth parts of the question which 
give initial structure to the court’s gatekeeping task, and contextually 
guide the answers to the particular issues raised by the first and third 
parts of the question.  In the proper performance of this judicial 
function, one must start with the second and fourth inquiries, and it 
is often most helpful to start with the fourth.  For this reason we will 
number and label the various parts of the complex question set out 
above as follows: 
1. Framing the case-specific target issue. 
2. Framing the case-specific claim of expertise. 
3. Determining what available information bears on a rational 
belief warrant in regard to the reliability of the specifically 
claimed expertise. 
4. Determining the proper case-specific legal standard of certainty 
for such a belief warrant. 
How these inquiries should be conducted in particular cases can 
perhaps be best illustrated by starting with a toxic tort hypothetical, 
somewhat simplified, but not too removed from the real world. 
IDENTIFYING THE TASK-SPECIFIC RELIABILITY QUESTION FOR EXPLICIT 
PRODUCTS OF SCIENCE 
Assume that a plaintiff is claiming that her deformed foot was 
caused by exposure to a compound, legally prescribed to and 
ingested as a drug by her mother during pregnancy, which goes 
under the trade name Benediction.71  In order to establish the legally 
required element of causation, she intends to call (perhaps alone, 
perhaps among other intended experts) a toxicologist who will base 
his testimony on the role of in utero exposure to Benediction in 
causing abnormalities of the feet in humans on animal studies 
involving the administration of Benediction to lab rats. 
1. Framing the case-specific target issue 
Somewhat ironically, the problem of defining the appropriate 
scope of the case-specific reliability issue is least in that troublesome 
area that precipitated the Daubert revolution, “increased risk” 
causation in toxic tort.  In each case, the target issue is more or less 
self-defining.  No judge would be tempted to define the issue in the 
 
 71 The play on the name of the controversial real-world compound Bendectin is 
obvious, but the reader should not lose sight of the fact that Benediction is a 
fictitious compound used only to illustrate the process of framing the reliability 
question. 
  
2003 KUMHO TIRE AND EXPERT RELIABILITY 35 
Benediction birth defect case as, “Is there good reason to believe that 
the proffered product of claimed expertise provides appropriately 
reliable information on whether an ingested chemical can cause birth 
defects?”  This part of the target “task at hand” question automatically 
coalesces around the particular chemical or biological agent attacked 
as a causal agent by the plaintiff.  Nor is it likely that the issue ought 
to be drawn in regard to a particular subclass of Benediction, given 
the general fungibility of effect for chemical compounds of the same 
formula.  While there might perhaps be inference issues concerning, 
for example, what to make of data on causation from compounds 
closely related to Benediction chemically, those are external validity 
questions that go to the belief warrant for the relevancy of the 
proffered evidence, not to a primary part of the target issue itself. 
Similarly, the real question under investigation in such a case 
cannot be “Did Benediction cause this particular plaintiff’s birth 
defect?” (in anything but a purely formal or notional sense72), 
because such a question is unanswerable, at least in the ways we find 
most satisfying when dealing with causation in everyday 
commonsense terms (causation thought of by a sort of “mechanical 
linkage” metaphor which is most comfortably understood in 
situations of physical trauma73).  This is for two reasons: first, because 
it is exceedingly rare that every exposure to such a claimed causal 
agent is followed by the asserted effect, and second, because such 
birth defects have a background rate of natural occurrence, and, at 
least in the current state of knowledge, there is no means of knowing 
whether the plaintiff’s defect was one of the ones which was going to 
occur anyway even absent exposure to Benediction.  In other words, 
such cases cannot yield satisfying answers to questions of “but-for” 
causation.74  At least in the present state of our knowledge, they often 
manifest what appears to be significant randomness in any causal 
linkage that exists, and this element of the random might conceivably 
 
 72 That notional sense is still embodied in the black letter of the law.  See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § 
28(a) (Tentative Draft No. 3 Apr. 7, 2003) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT, T.D. 3]. 
 73 Such a mechanical linkage model works fine for many everyday interactions, 
but can easily become what Shadish, Cook & Campbell refer to as “a billiard ball 
model that requires commitment to deterministic causation or that excludes 
reciprocal causation,” observing that such a model is “a caricature of descriptive 
causation that has not been used in philosophy or in science for many years . . . .”  
SHADISH ET AL., supra note 44, at 465. 
 74 And therefore, in such cases, issues of general and specific causation collapse 
into one another in the individual case, in that, at least once individual exposure has 
been established, both are to be inferred simultaneously from exactly the same 
evidence (data). 
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be found to be part of the linkage phenomenon even if we had 
perfect knowledge. 
So our real expert inquiry must be something like, “How much 
did Benediction exposure raise the probability of the plaintiff being 
born with her birth defect?”  However, this is still underspecified.  
Virtually all such claimed relationships, when they are shown to exist, 
exhibit substantial “dose effects,” that is, variations in induced risk 
depending on the amount of exposure or dose level.75  Because this is 
true, we should take it into account in framing the “task at hand” 
target issue, which thus becomes, “Given the level of exposure of the 
plaintiff to Benediction as shown by the other evidence, how much 
does that exposure raise the probability of birth defects?”  But this 
also remains potentially underspecified, since many teratogens raise 
the risk for some classes of birth defects a lot and other classes of 
defects almost not at all.  So the final iteration of the empirical 
question becomes, “Given the plaintiff’s exposure level as shown by 
the other evidence, how much does such exposure raise the risk of 
birth defects of the kind exhibited by plaintiff?” 
There are still hard issues left, of course.  The first one is a legal 
issue: What rise in risk (increased probability of birth defects) is 
enough to fasten liability onto the defendant?  This is a “question of 
law” (or of legal policy) of the normal type.  The most popular 
answer currently is a doubling of risk,76 because given a large number 
of cases, at least half the people paid in such cases are paid by those 
who should pay.77  A lower required risk increase results in the 
 
 75 See Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue Henefin, Reference Guide on Toxicology, in 
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 406-09 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter 
REFERENCE MANUAL].  Even in the so-called “no threshold model,” not every exposure 
actually causes an effect.  Id. at 407.  The model merely posits that any exposure might 
cause an effect.  Note that dose is a function both of intensity and duration of 
exposure.  RESTATEMENT, T.D. 3, supra note 72, § 28 reporter’s note, at 163-64 (citing 
authorities).  Note further that the handiest short summary of current issues in 
causation in the toxic tort settings is to be found in this reporters note. 
 76 RESTATEMENT, T.D. 3, supra note 72, § 28 reporter’s note, at 180-82 (citing 
authorities). 
 77 This is at least true in regard to “physical deformity” birth defects such as the 
one in the hypothetical, which by definition have a pre-birth onset.  As to other 
conditions, such as cancer caused by a teratogen, some percentage of the group 
(which particular individuals are unknown) would have gotten the cancer anyway, 
and thus they have had their cancer accelerated (maybe a lot, maybe a little) instead 
of being individuals who got cancer and otherwise would have been free of such 
cancer throughout their lives.  See Sander Greenland & James M. Robins, 
Epidemiology, Justice, and the Probability of Causation, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 321 (2000).  
Whether and exactly how the possibility of  “mere” acceleration should affect the 
legally required standard of sufficient risk increase, or whether it should be viewed as 
a remedies issue, is unclear. 
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majority of people who are paid out of defendants’ pockets being the 
people who would have gotten the condition without the defendants’ 
input, and to that degree gives that set of plaintiffs (whose individual 
members cannot be identified) a windfall.  This makes defendants 
become insurers for damages they did not cause.  A higher required 
risk increase results in injured parties not recovering who ought to be 
paid by defendant, which raises both justice and efficiency problems.  
These are persuasive arguments to many on what the standard of the 
law ought to be, but there are other arguments which can be made in 
favor of both higher and lower risk increases as standards of legal 
responsibility.78  The point here is not which legal standard is best, 
but merely that this decision has nothing to do directly with control 
of the reliability of expertise, or the kind of information which 
experts can justifiably provide. 
A related legal issue concerns the question of how sure the 
factfinder must be concerning the legally designated risk increase in 
order to reach a verdict, but that is again a legal issue of applicable 
standard of proof.  Difficult as such issues may be, they remain 
questions of law for the judge (or the legislature) outside the domain 
of any expert.  It will be necessary, however, for the judge to be clear 
on the applicable legal requirements at the point of framing the 
reliability question, because that legal requirement forms a part of 
the question to be answered by reference to the proffered expertise.  
Thus, the final form of the target issue becomes, “Given the plaintiff’s 
exposure level, did that exposure raise plaintiff’s risk of developing 
the deformity she now has by at least a factor of two (or ‘a significant 
amount’ or ‘by a factor of ten’ or ‘to a reasonable certainty,’ that is, 
whatever the applicable legal standard may be that will be treated as 
establishing causation)?” 
2. Framing the case-specific claim of expertise 
Having framed the empirical target of the proposed expertise, 
the court will then face the problem of expressing in exact form the 
expert claims that are said to bear on the target issue.  In risk-increase 
toxic tort cases, this will almost certainly be information of varying 
 
 78 A lower required risk increase might promote care and safety, a higher 
required risk increase might encourage the development of more specific evidence 
concerning sub-populations to separate out the sub-populations in the large-set data 
that can be identified as having different relative risks.  Specifically, this would 
encourage efforts to tailor research to narrower populations, thus reducing the 
possibility of “substructuring” (the uneven distribution of risk within a sampled 
population), and yielding more confidence in the applicability of the risk numbers 
to the individual case. 
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quality from a fairly limited number of domains of inquiry, such as 
epidemiology, experimentation on animals, information on the 
effects of compounds claimed to be related to the compound in the 
case, etc.  All of these proffers will have a significant claim to being 
“scientific evidence,” that is, the products of some part of normal 
science practice.  Indeed, given the nature of the target inquiry in 
such a case, it would seem extremely unlikely that any evidence would 
be proffered that was not claimed to be scientific in this sense. 
One characteristic of any testimony that might arguably be 
deemed the product of science is that it will be traceable back to data.  
In addition, in most parts of science (and certainly all those that 
might provide reliable information on risk increase in toxic tort), the 
testimony will be traceable back to formal data.  By formal data we 
mean the products of some organized regime of observation where 
both the observation protocols and the results are explicit and 
objectively recorded in some way, and therefore both potentially 
available and replicable.  The information in the proposed expert’s 
testimony may reflect data only at second hand, or in summary, or in 
some sort of combination conceptually.  It may reflect extension, 
induction, and abduction away from the data.  But to the extent that, 
upon examination, it cannot be traced back to formal data in some 
way, it cannot presume to wear the mantle of science. 
The first necessary step, therefore, is to describe, at least in 
general, the kind of data upon which the proposed expert’s 
testimony is based.  In our hypothetical, we have said that the 
proffered expert proposes to testify about the results of (data 
generated by) studies of Benediction administered to pregnant 
laboratory rats, the observed rates of deformity of the extremities with 
and without such exposure in resulting offspring, and also the 
implications of those studies for forming a judgment about the likely 
risk increase, if any, in humans exposed to Benediction, as well as the 
magnitude of such increase.  This kind of testimony may immediately 
be seen to have two significantly different aspects: one dealing with 
the validity and meaning of the study data in their own terms (i.e., 
Were the studies undertaken by procedures that allow us to say 
reliably what the data mean concerning effects or associations in the 
groups of animals tested?), and the other dealing with reasoning 
from the data to groups other than the one tested (i.e., Would the 
data distributions hold for other animals of the same species, other 
animals of different closely related species, other animals not so 
closely related, higher or lower dosages as a ratio of body weight, in 
each of these groups, etc.?). 
The first of these aspects of science-based testimony raises 
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questions about what is called “internal validity”—essentially, “Are the 
data any good in their own apparent terms, given the way they were 
generated?”79  The second of these aspects raises issues of “external 
validity,”80—that is, “How far are we justified in taking the data, 
assuming them to be accurate in their own terms, and in drawing 
implications or conclusions in other contexts either very closely 
related (other members of the same sex and age of the same species) 
or much further away (say, humans)?”  If you hear an echo of the 
problem of “area of expertise” and the Ford Taurus mechanic, you 
would not be wrong. 
As to internal validity, it is accomplished by adhering to 
procedures designed in advance to eliminate, to the extent possible, 
potential confounding factors.81  Science in general has a few general 
norms of such good practice, and each particularized special area of 
inquiry supplements the general norms with others purpose-built to 
reduce or eliminate the particular threats to internal validity that 
reflection has suggested as the most dangerous in that particular 
domain.82  Internal validity depends on good study design and 
execution. 
The essence of external validity is not so easy to suggest.  No one 
 
 79 This is close enough for our purposes without getting too deeply into the 
technical controversies that have surrounded the notion in the land of its birth.  The 
concept was formulated by the late eminent psychologist Donald Campbell in the 
1950’s in the context of cause-and-effect studies, and in that tradition is generally 
limited to such studies.  SHADISH et al., supra note 44, at 37.  It was originally 
contrasted with “external validity” in much the same terms as are used in the text, 
that is, external validity referred to extension of conclusions to contexts outside the 
narrow bounds of the actual study.  Id.  In later refinements, the Campbellian 
taxonomy of validity for causal studies expanded to include two more validity 
components, “statistical conclusion validity” and “construct validity.”  Statistical 
conclusion validity refers to the validity of statistical conclusions derived from data in 
individual studies.  Id.  Construct validity refers to the validity of constructs suggested 
by an individual study or studies.  A strong argument can be made that statistical 
conclusion validity can best be viewed as an aspect of internal validity and that 
construct validity is best viewed as an aspect of external validity.  However, Campbell 
and his school view them as independent.  Id.  It is unnecessary for present purposes 
to explore this more fully.  Also, for present purposes, it makes sense to apply both 
external and internal validity notions to skills testing contexts as well as cause-and-
effect contexts.  (There is an argument by which one can equate or convert skills 
tests to cause-and-effect tests, but it is beyond the scope of this footnote and this 
Article.) 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 39-42. 
 82 For instance, in any inquiry using humans as apprehenders or interpreters, 
one such principle is “keep the process of data collection and analysis as blind as 
possible for as long as possible.”  Robert Rosenthal, How Often Are Numbers Wrong?, 33 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1005, 1007 (1978). 
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believes that internally valid results of studies have meaning only for 
the exact entities in the exact universe studied.  Everyone is easily 
convinced that they may be generalized to other universes not 
studied, as long as they are populated by entities exactly like the ones 
in the studied universe.  One of the bases for the scientific success of 
physics and chemistry is their good fortune at their foundations to be 
dealing with universes of entities that are virtually completely alike, 
and therefore fungible when it comes to generalizing from data (you 
seen one gamma ray or atom of a hydrogen isotope, you seen ’em all, 
pretty much literally for most purposes83). 
When one moves into biological systems, however, such 
fungibility starts to break down, but in what patterns and for what 
purposes, it is not usually clear.  This raises difficult questions about 
principles of external validity for study results, such as: “When are 
results in mice going to track results in humans?”  Note that the 
answer is not likely to be universal.  Few would instinctively say 
“always.”  One might be tempted to say “never,” but the effects of a 
hydrogen bomb on a mouse at ground zero is likely to correspond to 
the effects on a human pretty completely.  Ultimately, it is an 
empirical question subject to investigation, but ironically it is a 
question that can only be answered completely by doing studies that 
render the question moot for most purposes, since you have to 
establish the effects on humans by direct empirical study in order to 
be sure of the correspondence, and then you do not need to reason 
from the animal model for that effect.  In some animals, however, 
there can be enough experience for suggestive patterns to develop 
which indicate the tenability and strength of reasoning by extension 
in regard to at least some classes of phenomena in humans.84 
On some questions, some kinds of studies have a validity 
advantage because they come close to dealing with the question 
under investigation without the necessity of too much extension.  
This is why epidemiology has been viewed as epistemically privileged 
on issues of risk increase in toxic tort.  A well-designed epidemiology 
study of the very agent in question at the same exposure levels as are 
involved in the case at bar comes close to answering the risk-increase 
question directly.  The key term here is “well-designed.”  
Epidemiological studies are at least as difficult to design in internally 
valid ways as other kinds of studies85 and may suffer from potential 
 
 83 Except for the loose use of the term “see.” 
 84 Goldstein & Henefin, supra note 75, at 410-11. 
 85 Michael D. Green, D. Michael Freedman & Leon Gordis, Reference Guide on 
Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 75, at 354-73. 
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confounds involving sampling bias,86 improper control designs,87 and 
low statistical power resulting from inappropriately small sample sizes 
for the potential effect size being studied,88 among others.  The 
results of bad epidemiology with poor indices of internal validity have 
no claim to any privileged position just because its bad data would be 
more directly meaningful to the question under investigation if it 
were good.  (This illustrates that internal and external validity are not 
theoretically independent, but rather they are nested.  Internal 
validity can exist in theory without external validity, but there can be 
no external validity without internal validity.) 
Good epidemiology is difficult to design and very expensive.  In 
many toxic tort claims, good epidemiology is just not available.  It is 
one thing to say that good epidemiology trumps other sources of 
information when available.  It is another to say that questionable 
epidemiology should lock out other relevant information from other 
domains of inquiry, and yet another to say, as some courts have, that 
only epidemiology can form the basis of sufficient and sufficiently 
reliable information to take a risk-increase causation issue to the 
jury.89 
This is not to deny that the presence of internal and external 
validity problems can so undermine the reliability of proffered 
testimony claiming to be the product of science that it is not 
sufficiently reliable to deserve entry to the courtroom at all.  This 
would be especially true where there was a consensus in the generally 
relevant scientific communities that the data were unreliable or the 
extensions unjustified even for provisional belief, or that more 
apposite evidence rendered the proffered conclusions highly 
unlikely.  It seems prudent, not only to find that such substantial 
outliers provide insufficient evidence even to support a 
preponderance verdict alone,90 but also to exclude them in order to 
 
 86 Id. at 355-56. 
 87 Id. at 363-64. 
 88 Id. at 362. 
 89 Such a so-called “epidemiologcal threshold” was first employed in Brock v. 
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 874 F.2d. 307, 315 (5th Cir. 1989) (construing Texas law).  
Most courts properly reject it.  See, for example, the extensive authorities collected 
in RESTATEMENT, T.D. 3, supra note 72, § 28 reporter’s note, at 170-71. 
 90 As Christopher Mueller points out, there is nothing wrong with granting 
summary judgment after a “Daubert hearing” because the proffered expert testimony 
is so unreliable that it would not be reasonable for a jury to base a verdict on it.  
Christopher B. Mueller, Daubert Asks the Right Questions: Now Appellate Courts Should 
Help Find the Right Answers, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 987 (2003).  Perhaps courts in 
such cases would be better advised if they simply said this instead of declaring such 
evidence “inadmissible” under Rule 702, then granting summary judgment for 
having no evidence.  Courts should avoid making admissibility determinations or 
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insulate the jury from potential reliance on them even when there is 
other evidence, and this seems to be what was envisioned in Daubert 
and Kumho Tire. 
However, some residue of questions in both spheres of validity 
will be present in the most reliable scientific evidence.  Studies are 
rarely perfect, or perfectly on target, and the fact that available 
studies are not perfect or require some extension to apply to the 
target causation issue should not automatically result in exclusion of 
testimony based on them, no matter how forcefully their 
imperfections are pointed out. 
It is not uncommon for causal relationships to be inferred by the 
convergence of information from various domains at some remove 
from the target issue, where the product of no single domain could 
be said to be a reliable indicator of causation by itself.  This is not 
surprising.  It is the normal way of circumstantial evidence, building 
walls by bricks in ordinary trials.  When there are interlocking and 
mutually corroborating results from a variety of domains and studies 
that individually are all subject to plausible external validity 
objections, it would seem that exclusion based on external validity 
grounds ought to be approached with caution and an attempt at 
sophistication.  We are not saying that some external validity leaps are 
not so great that they would form the proper basis for excluding any 
proffers of expert testimony based on them.  When the leap is closer, 
however, and there is not much valid affirmative counterevidence 
from more epistemically privileged domains, it would seem that 
external validity issues in toxic tort causation cases would be better 
controlled by sufficiency judgments rather than threshold 
admissibility judgments, or left to the jury, especially given the 
preponderance standard of proof obtaining in civil cases. 
3. Determining what available information bears on a rational belief 
warrant in regard to the reliability of the claimed expertise (“good 
reason to believe”) 
Thus far, in our hypothetical toxic tort, we have filled in the 
generally applicable question as follows: “Is there good reason to 
believe that a witness with training and credentials in toxicology, 
basing his testimony explicitly in large part on formal data from 
animal studies involving the exposure of white mice to large amounts 
of Benediction, can give testimony of sufficient reliability for the 
purposes of the law on the issue of whether the risk of congenital foot 
 
declarations except in cases where admissibility would actually make a difference. 
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deformities in humans at least doubles as a result of in utero exposure 
to Benediction of the kind involved in this case?”  We still must deal 
with how a court is to approach the issues entailed in the phrase 
“good reason to believe [that the proffered expert testimony] is 
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of the law.”  Let us start by asking 
what constitutes “good reason to believe,” that is, what is sometimes 
called a proper belief warrant, in regard to information such as this. 
We are lucky in that this rather deep question of philosophy is 
comparatively easy to answer satisfactorily in regard to proffered 
expert evidence about risk-increase causation in toxic tort, and 
doubly lucky in that addressing the question in this context will give 
us leverage which will be useful in dealing with questions of proper 
belief warrant in regard to other kinds of claimed expertise. 
A reasonable determination of the proper factors that go into a 
warranted belief in risk-increase causation claims is comparatively 
easy because virtually any such information will of necessity be the 
product of science narrowly defined, as explained above.  And 
therefore: 
A. If we believe that information properly generated by the 
methods required of practitioners of science by the applicable 
practice norms of the area in which they operate has a high claim 
to reliability, 
B. Then it is appropriate to look to that science practice itself for 
the proper variables affecting warranted belief for such a claimed 
product. 
These sound a bit circular, but they are not.  The first merely 
asks whether science has a privileged claim to reliability on some 
types of questions.  We need not undertake an extensive discussion to 
conclude that an affirmative answer is judicially noticeable in regard 
to issues of empirically observable fact and the structures of 
generalization (theories) that are built on them.  Indeed, the Daubert 
Court’s invocation of the concept of falsifiability seems to have been 
intended to suggest the scope of the domain of inquiry that can in 
theory have a claim to being “scientific.”  Therefore, all that remains 
is to determine the factors that go into a proper belief warrant, both 
as to internal and external validity, in the area of science which 
generated the data upon which the proffered expert is relying.  Of 
course “all that remains” is easy to say, but the task is far from trivial.  
It is, however, doable.  Each area of real science will have an 
associated literature dealing with proper methodology and issues 
raised by various threats to validity.  Some of these will be common to 
most science (for instance, the requirement of procedures to guard 
against observer effects when human perceptors, raters, or evaluators 
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must be used).91  Others may be specific to a given area of inquiry 
(dose level issues in toxicology, especially as they relate to 
generalizations from animal data, for instance).  In every case, the 
court is of necessity obliged to become acquainted with these criteria 
sufficiently to evaluate the general strength of the testimony’s claim 
to reliability, that is, why and to what degree one would be warranted 
in believing what the expert asserts. 
This was what the Daubert Court appears to have believed it was 
attempting generally in the outlining of the (in)famous “four” 
factors:92 (1) falsifiability or testability, and testing (whether a claim 
“can (and has been) tested”); (2) establishment of (potential or 
actual) error rates; (3) peer review and publication; and (4) general 
acceptance.  Of those factors, only the general notions of “the extent 
to which a claim has been tested” and the establishment vel non of 
“known error rates” (which is just a byproduct of what would be 
required to count as adequate testing in many areas of scientific 
inquiry) approach directly an evaluation of validity.  We take these to 
mean little more (and no less!) than the proposition that any area 
unconcerned with testing and error rates has no claim to scientific 
validity in the sense of being a proper product of science.  Whether 
there can be some other basis for a belief warrant for such non-
science-based expert claims is an issue we will come to in due course. 
The other two Daubert factors attempt to use peer evaluations of 
validity (either by reference to a small group of pre-publication 
reviewers, or a larger community) as an alternative source of 
information to the court’s own evaluations.  Unfortunately, like the 
Frye test before them, these factors provide weak warrants in areas 
with low claims to validity under the general norms of science but 
with a guild structure that allows them to claim peer acceptance both 
in regard to publication and specific review, and in regard to 
community acceptance.93 
The “Daubert factors” are usually supplemented by Daubert’s 
further requirement of proper “fit” between the data and the 
problem presented by the case.94  Here, the Court seems to have been 
getting at something akin to problems of external validity and 
extension.  Taken together, these general “Daubert criteria” have 
 
 91 See Risinger et al., Observer Effects, supra note 18, at 9. 
 92 For a fuller analysis of the three or four or five or eight or nine “factors,” see 
supra note 64. 
 93 The Court in Kumho Tire recognized as much when it said that the general 
acceptance factor was not a good indicator of reliability “where the discipline itself 
lacks reliability.”  526 U.S. at 151. 
 94 See supra notes 64, 70. 
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often been treated as a mechanical checklist by both lawyers and 
judges with all the skill displayed in the product of an 
undistinguished paint-by-number picture.95 
Perhaps it is unduly harsh to be too critical of the Daubert 
Court’s less-than-perfect framing of these reliability considerations.  
After all, it was a brave maiden voyage into waters uncharted at least 
by the law, being undertaken by admirals unfamiliar with even the 
kind of hazards that might lie there.  To its credit, the Court did say 
that none of the factors were either necessary or sufficient, but this 
was lost by many who followed what they took to be their sailing 
directions.  It might yet be possible that Kumho Tire’s emphasis on 
seeking the best criteria of validity reasonably applicable to the 
particular proffer of expertise under challenge (perhaps 
supplemented by utilization of neutral experts to educate the judge 
on the reliability problems specific to particular areas of scientific 
inquiry involved in the case) can lead in the direction of more 
defensible consideration and use of information actually bearing on 
the validity of proffered scientific evidence (when actual scientific 
evidence is really what is being proffered).  However, even this may 
not always lead to better rulings on “Daubert motions,” because there 
is still one criterion to be examined which, poorly handled, can lead 
to questionable results. 
4. Determining the proper case-specific legal standard of certainty for 
such a belief warrant (“sufficient reliability for the purposes of the 
law”) 
Even if the whole validity issue is evaluated in a sophisticated and 
rational manner, there remains the question of “how reliable is 
reliable enough” for the purposes of the law, in order for the 
proposed testimony to be admissible.  It seems to us that that issue 
must of necessity depend on a variety of factors, such as whether the 
expert will testify to a conclusion or as an educational witness to 
supplement the factfinder’s general knowledge, whether the issue 
involved is a specific fact or a magnitude judgment, and so forth.96  
One centrally important factor would seem to be the underlying case 
standard of proof and its attendant distribution of burdens.  We do 
not intend to discuss this extensively here, except to say that if courts 
 
 95 For a particularly egregious recent example, see the two-paragraph attempt by 
Judge Bownes regarding the reliability of handwriting identification expertise in 
United States v. Mooney, 315 F.3d 54, 62-63 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 96 A range of such variables is discussed in Risinger, Taxonomy, supra note 37, 
throughout, but particularly summarized at pp. 535-36. 
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adopt reliability standards (as opposed to reliability-affecting criteria) 
from science, they run the risk of excluding proffered testimony 
according to too high a preliminary standard when the applicable 
case standard is low.97 
Take the following hypothetical: Let us assume that toxicology as 
an enterprise displays a great fear of ever making an affirmative claim 
of causation which turns out to be wrong.  Toxicologists pride 
themselves on being able to say, “When we declare that ‘A’ causes ‘B,’ 
you can bank on it.”  As a result, they refuse even to consider basing 
any notion of causation on any relationship shown by data, if the 
relationship might have occurred by chance even one time in a 
thousand.  They may be said to have a terror of false positives, and 
not to care much about overlooking relationships that others might 
find persuasive.  (It would be hard to call these false negatives, 
because the toxicologists simply remain agnostic about such 
relationships, but they are errors of another sort, perhaps.) 
Now assume the only evidence available on causation is from 
toxicology, and it shows an association which could not be accounted 
for by random occurrence one time in a hundred.  The toxicologist 
would say the information was insufficient to draw a conclusion and, 
therefore, fundamentally useless.  The usual scientist (who would 
probably find information meaningful that would only be the 
product of random occurrence one time in twenty, since this 
corresponds to the conventional .05 level adopted for statistical 
significance) would accept the information, and might base decisions 
on it that would be justified in her field.  If a gatekeeper stood 
between the toxicologist’s information and the usual scientist, and 
applied the toxicologist’s criterion for “reliable enough for use,” the 
usual scientist would be deprived of the information even though it 
was good enough for her purposes, so she would be cut off from 
doing with the information what it was proper for her to do within 
her sphere.  The admission decision would have improperly 
prevented her consideration of information, by importing without 
thought the standard of “reliable enough” from the domain of the 
information’s original generation, just because it was there. 
Similarly, in the legal context, the conventional level of certainty 
required to say a relationship is established in the sciences is 
conservative compared to that represented by the normal tort 
standard of proof (a preponderance of the evidence), which equates 
 
 97 A similar point is made more extensively in Neil B. Cohen, The Gatekeeping Role 
in Civil Litigation and the Abdication of Legal Values in Favor of Scientific Values, 33 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 943 (2003). 
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the disvalue of false positives and false negatives.  Hence, adopting 
too high a standard, even by claiming to import it from the science 
that gave rise to the data, runs the risk of depriving the person with 
the burden of production and persuasion reasonably reliable 
information on the issues of the case.  Such concerns seem at least in 
part to have driven the New Jersey Supreme Court in its creation of 
special rules for dealing with reliability in risk-increase causation 
cases, starting with Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp.98 and proceeding 
through Landrigan v. Celotex Corp.99 to the recent case of Kemp ex rel. 
Wright v. State.100 
We are not saying that there is always an easy solution to the 
issue of what is “reliable enough for the purposes of the law.”101  All 
we can do is call on courts not to be too quick to exclude proffered 
expertise in civil cases based on unsophisticated acceptance of the 
proposition that a relationship shown by the data upon which it is 
based is not “statistically significant,” especially when there is 
information from multiple domains being proffered on the same 
issue.  In addition, we think it proper to observe here that the 
corollary of our position is that information reliable enough to be 
admitted for one legal purpose, with a low attached standard of 
proof, is not necessarily reliable enough to be admitted for a 
different legal purpose with a high attached standard of proof.  To 
put it bluntly, we believe that information properly admitted in civil 
cases is not necessarily reliable enough for admission by the 
prosecution in criminal cases.  We know this position is currently 
looked upon as something of a heresy,102 though there are plenty of 
legal contexts in which courts have applied such differential 
 
 98 125 N.J. 421 (1991). 
 99 127 N.J. 404 (1992). 
 100 174 N.J. 412 (2002). 
 101 Professor Neil B. Cohen showed quite a while ago that there is plenty of room 
to use analogues to the notion of confidence in probability theory in approaching 
the concept of preponderance.  Viewed this way, we may think of preponderance 
sufficiency as requiring fair certainty that the true value of the probability derived 
from the evidence falls within a range all of which is above 50 percent.  See Neil B. 
Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowledge, 
60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385 (1985); see also Neil B. Cohen, Conceptualizing Proof and 
Calculating Probabilities: A Response to Professor Kaye, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 78 (1987).  
Such a metaphor is available even when part or all of the proffered testimony is 
derived from information not formally quantified.  To the extent that Rule 702 
“sufficient reliability” is in most contexts properly conceived of as more than simple 
relevance and less than full sufficiency, such analyses must come into play in 
informing that judgment also. 
 102 See, e.g., Roger C. Park, Daubert on a Tilted Playing Field, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1113 (2003). 
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standards, making admission easier in civil cases than by the 
prosecution in criminal cases.  Nevertheless, whatever one’s ultimate 
position on that point, we would hope to obtain universal agreement 
that, to the extent prosecution proffers are held to lower standards of 
reliability than those of civil plaintiffs or criminal defendants (which 
seems to be the case in general),103 something is seriously out of 
kilter. 
FRAMING THE TASK-SPECIFIC RELIABILITY QUESTION FOR “EXPERIENCE-
BASED” EXPERTISE 
We have given a general form of question, which we have said 
applies in formulating the reliability question in every case 
whatsoever: “Is there good reason to believe that the product of the 
claim of expertise being proffered is sufficiently reliable to be 
considered by the jury on the question (i.e., the target empirical issue 
upon which the expert testimony is proffered)?”  We have explored 
the proper filling out of that question in regard to scientific evidence, 
properly so called, generated by the methods of science and based on 
formal data.  Let us now see how the content of the general reliability 
question changes when faced with expert claims that are not, in 
significant and central part, the product of science, but the product 
of some other source of information claimed to possess an 
appropriate level of reliability.  To make the exercise as concrete as 
possible, let us do so in regard to the very facts and the very claims at 
issue in the Kumho Tire case itself. 
When a tire on the vehicle being driven by Patrick Carmichael 
blew out, the vehicle overturned, one passenger died, and others 
were injured.104  The tire that blew out was old and nearly bald, with 
two previous improperly repaired punctures.105  The blowout resulted 
from a separation of the tread plies from the carcass of the tire.106  It 
was uncontested that in a non-defective tire that had never been 
misused at all, the tread would not separate merely as a result of 
normal driving that wore the tread smooth.107  So the blowout either 
 
 103 See generally Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability, supra note 3.  At least in the 
civil cases it is generally recognized that “[r]ulings on admissibility under Daubert 
inherently require the trial court to conduct an exacting analysis of the proffered 
expert’s methodology.”  McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1257 
(11th Cir. 2002).  This is not commonly done regarding prosecution proffers 
challenged pursuant to Daubert/Kumho. 
 104 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 142. 
 105 Id. at 143. 
 106 Id. at 144. 
 107 Id. at 143-44. 
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resulted from cumulative improper use (excessive sidewall flexing 
from wrong inflation, damage from curb impact, etc.) or a 
manufacturing defect, such as improperly bonded plies in the tire 
carcass, that took a long time to manifest itself.108  Only the latter 
circumstance would render Kumho Tire, the manufacturer, liable, so 
the plaintiffs had the burden of producing sufficient evidence which, 
if believed, would justify the conclusion that the accident more likely 
than not resulted from such a defect.  To that end, they intended to 
rely at trial on the testimony of Dennis Carlson, Jr.,109 an engineer 
with substantial experience in the tire manufacturing industry110 who 
consulted as an expert in what he called “tire failure analysis.”111  
Defendant Kumho Tire claimed that it was beyond the current state 
of any art to assign this failure to a manufacturing defect rather than 
cumulative misuse.112  Carlson, however, claimed that he could do it, 
that he had done it, and that the failure resulted from a 
manufacturing defect.113  In reaching this conclusion, he relied upon 
his visual inspection of the tire and rim,114 his experience,115 and 
certain factual propositions which he claimed were true, but which 
the tire company claimed were not known by him or anyone else to 
be true in reality.116 
The first factual claim was that the form of abuse that most 
commonly resulted in tread separation was long-term underinflation, 
which resulted in too much tire flexing while driving, and that this 
was so much the most common factor that other possible sources of 
abuse could be ignored, at least unless there was specific evidence of 
them.117 
The second factual claim was that any tire which had been 
subject to such underinflation would always manifest some 
combination of four physical symptoms which could be observed: (1) 
treadwear on the edges of the tread greater than in the center of the 
 
 108 Id. at 144.  Presumably, both defect and abuse might have been contributing 
causes.  This would raise issues of comparative responsibility under the applicable 
state law having nothing to do with the Rule 702 issue.  The Supreme Court treated 
the 702 issue as being properly represented by the dichotomous choice, and 
therefore so have we here. 
 109 Id. at 142. 
 110 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 156. 
 111 Id. at 142. 
 112 Id. at 145. 
 113 Id. at 144. 
 114 Id. at 144, 153-54. 
 115 Id. at 156. 
 116 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 144. 
 117 See id. at 144. 
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tread; (2) wear of a groove on the tire’s “bead” (the part that rests 
against the rim of the wheel upon which the tire is mounted); (3) 
sidewalls with signs of deterioration such as discoloration; and (4) 
marks on the flange part of the rim itself.118 
The third factual claim was that in the absence of evidence of 
“significant”119 amounts of at least two of these symptoms, a defect was 
the most likely cause of the tread separation and blowout.120  (This is 
the part that the Court later referred to as the “two-factor test”;121 it is 
really an “any two of four factors test.”) 
While Carlson conceded that there were some signs of each of 
these symptoms manifested in the Carmichael tire and rim, he 
asserted that none of them was enough to be significant, based on his 
experience (or in the case of the edgewear, it was not significant 
because the inside and outside edges were worn in differing 
amounts).122 
1. Framing the target issue 
In this case, the target issue is fairly easy to frame once the facts 
are recounted in sufficient detail: “whether, more likely than not, the 
tire that failed on the plaintiff’s vehicle left the Kumho Tire factory 
with a defect that finally manifested itself in (caused) the tire failure 
that resulted in the accident.”  Note that this question is not framed 
to require proof of any particular kind of defect, such as improper 
bonding of plies, but can be satisfied if the combined probability of 
all possible late-manifesting defects that could result in the failure 
observed was greater than the combined probabilities from non-
defect-caused failure due to the combined effects of normal wear and 
tear and occasional misuse from improper inflation, curb trauma, etc.  
Note further that, unlike risk-increase causation in a toxic tort case, 
this question does not involve any particularly fancy legal issues, 
except the normal ones involved in ordinary “but for” causation, 
where the condition for which defendant is responsible must only 
have been a contributing cause, not the sole cause, of the tire’s 
failure. 
 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 145. 
 120 Id. at 144. 
 121 Id. at 157. 
 122 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 144-45. 
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2. Framing the claim of expertise (the characteristics of the proffered 
product of claimed expertise, given its context and methodology) 
What was the basis of Carlson’s claim that he could offer reliable 
information of the existence of a manufacturing defect in a tire 
under the factual conditions applicable to this case?  Carlson’s 
proposed testimony offers a classic example of claimed expertise 
which will masquerade as the product of science as far as it can and 
take advantage of not being the product of science whenever that is 
beneficial.  As such, it provides an incredibly important and 
instructive template for examining and evaluating analogous claims 
that are the common grist of expert evidence in many important 
areas.  In showing why this is so, we will have to proceed rather slowly. 
First, let us deal with the issue of credentials, and how they do or 
do not bear on the issue of whether what is being done in a particular 
case is a product of science, or whether it is even significantly affected 
by the education and experience reflected by the credentials.  
Carlson was an automotive engineer.  What part does science play in 
engineering, and under what circumstances?123  More or less by 
definition, engineers are people who are educated in aspects of 
science applicable to the design and maintenance of certain types of 
artifacts or products.124  While “scientists doing science” are interested 
in the frontiers of knowledge, “engineers doing engineering” (all 
other things being equal) prefer to deal with well established 
principles, because they result in fewer risks in the resulting design or 
solution to the engineering problem at hand.  Of course, this 
simpleminded division of labor between scientists and engineers does 
not define very clear boundaries in the real world.  There are plenty 
of people with physics degrees doing “engineering,” and plenty of 
people with engineering degrees doing research or theory-building 
in ways that would count as “doing science.”125  So where did Carlson 
fit in? 
There is no reason to believe that Carlson had ever done any 
pertinent actual research himself, or was familiar with any body of 
formal data bearing on determining the existence of a manufacturing 
defect from the examination of a failed tire.  Even the science he had 
 
 123 This may seem like a silly question, but since a lot of what goes on in regard to 
expertise masquerading as partly the product of science is dependent on answers to 
questions like this, it is important to consider such foundational issues directly. 
 124 See Henry Petroski, Reference Guide on Engineering Practice and Methods, in 
REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 75, at 577.  “Science in its purest form theorizes about 
nature as it is found; engineering at its most basic re-forms the raw materials of 
nature into useful things.”  Id. at 579. 
 125 Id. at 581-84. 
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learned in order to become an engineer did not seem to undergird 
in any definable way either his methodology or his results.  No doubt 
the question of reconstructing the original characteristics of a tire as 
manufactured from the remnants of a failed tire could be the subject 
of research generating formal data by the standards of real science.  
One can imagine a regime of research consisting of running tires 
until failure on machines incorporating various metering devices, 
data from which might reveal objectively discernable indices 
apparent in the failed tires of various original conditions that would 
count as defects.  The point is, Carlson did not claim to be operating 
based on any such formal data or research of his own or of others.  
Both the principles of his methodology and his own performance of 
it, to the extent they could be said to be based on anything even 
arguably called data at all, were based on his own subjective 
observations over the course of his experience, available only to him, 
and in their individual form now almost certainly only imperfectly 
recalled, if at all.  In terms one of us has developed at length in 
another setting,126 Carlson claimed accuracy for a personal subjective 
translational system based on experience (translational in that it 
translates the meaning of the characteristics of the failed tire into the 
characteristics of the tire as it left the factory).  The claim at issue was 
that Carlson’s experience with tires had allowed him to develop, from 
his subjective database, four criteria for determining accurately (by 
his own subjective evaluation of the “significant” presence of these 
criteria) whether a given failed tire had been defective when it left 
the factory.  Thus he made both methodological claims and skill 
claims.  That is, he claimed that his “two of four” factor test, to the 
extent that it directed evaluation, was a reliable method, and that to 
the extent that reliable outcomes depended on his particular 
subjective judgment as part of the method, he claimed he could 
make those subjective judgments accurately (a claim of “skill” in 
making those subjective judgments).  We might say that the claim can 
be likened to that of a cook who has written a cookbook based on 
experience, with many of the recipes calling for the cook to add “a 
significant amount” of certain ingredients.  To the extent that a claim 
that this results in “good cooking” is based on actually following the 
cookbook, we would have to have a reason to believe the cookbook 
(the methodology) was sound.  But to the extent the proper outcome 
was based on a claim of skill supplementing (or even substituting for) 
the underspecified recipes of the cookbook, we would have to have 
some reason to believe that the cook actually possessed the claimed 
 
 126 See Risinger, Taxonomy, supra note 37, at 522-23. 
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skill, and we would have to know which skill was at issue in regard to 
each claim.  In this case, we would be properly concerned with the 
reasons to accept Carlson’s “two of four” factor test, and the reasons 
to accept Carlson’s judgmental skill about which levels of each factor 
are significant and which are not, in the combination manifested by 
the tire in the case before the court. 
The Supreme Court was very clear that this particularized 
approach to evaluation was required under Rule 702.  The 
circumstances applicable to Mr. Carlson and his methodology 
illustrate both these points.  The proponents of Mr. Carlson’s 
testimony tried to argue that the proper way to characterize his 
asserted expertise was very general, consisting of expertise in 
determining the existence of a defect from visual and tactile 
inspection, and that “a method of tire failure analysis which employs 
a visual/tactile inspection is a reliable method”127 since such a general 
approach might often be accurate.  The Court rejected this approach 
in no uncertain terms: 
For one thing, and contrary to respondents’ suggestion, the 
specific issue before the court was not the reasonableness in 
general of a tire expert’s use of a visual and tactile inspection to 
determine whether overdeflection had caused the tire’s tread to 
separate from its steel-belted carcass.  Rather, it was the 
reasonableness of using such an approach, along with Carlson’s 
particular method of analyzing the data thereby obtained, to draw a 
conclusion regarding the particular matter to which the expert testimony 
was directly relevant . . . .  The relevant issue was whether the expert 
could reliably determine the cause of this tire’s separation.128 
And later: 
Respondents now argue to us, as they did to the District Court, 
that a method of tire failure analysis that employs a visual/tactile 
inspection is a reliable method, and they point both to its use by 
other experts and to Carlson’s long experience working for 
Michelin as sufficient indication that that is so.  But no one denies 
that an expert might draw a conclusion from a set of observations 
based on extensive and specialized experience.  Nor does anyone 
deny that, as a general matter, tire abuse may often be identified 
by qualified experts through visual and tactile inspection of the 
tire.  As we said before, the question before the trial court was 
specific, not general.  The trial court had to decide whether this 
particular expert had sufficient specialized knowledge to assist the 
 
 127 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 156. 
 128 Id. at 153-54 (some emphasis added).  For a fuller exposition with even more 
extensive citation, see Risinger, Task at Hand, supra note 61, at 773-78. 
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jurors “in deciding the particular issues in the case.” 
The particular issue in this case concerned the use of Carlson’s 
two factor test and his related use of visual/tactile inspection to 
draw conclusions on the basis of what seemed to be small 
observational differences.129 
Thus, according to the Supreme Court, a court’s job under Rule 
702 is to identify the particular claim being made in the context of 
the particular circumstances of the case.  The real question is the 
reliability of the specific application of claimed expertise defined by 
the facts of the case.  So the issue was whether Carlson’s particular 
four-part “two factor” test, coupled with his subjective evaluation of 
the relative magnitude and significance of each of the four factors, 
had been shown to be a reliable way of determining a manufacturing 
defect when applied to a tire, such as the Carmichael tire, which was 
very old and very worn. 
Note here that we have not drawn the reliability issue in such a 
way that an answer would apply exclusively to the Carmichael tire, by 
including details such as “having exactly two inexpertly repaired 
punctures” or “being exactly 7.3 years old” or “belonging to a person 
whose surname begins with ‘C.’”  This would be artificially narrow, 
even given the Supreme Court’s language about “this tire.”  To frame 
the reliability question so artificially as to apply to “this tire” in so 
restrictive a way, and not also have it apply to other tires similarly 
situated in regard to the claimed expertise, would be 
counterproductive to the policies underlying the reliability 
requirement in the first place.  It would raise inappropriately trivial 
issues concerning the existence of applicable data—for example, it is 
unlikely that any tests that were ever done involved exactly two 
improperly repaired punctures—and deprive the decision of any 
possible precedential meaning for future cases.  The problem here is 
one of line drawing, both in regard to the claims of expertise and in 
regard to the uses to which the decision might be put in the future.  
To solve this “over-specificity/over-generality” dilemma, we propose 
the following approach: The reliability issue should be framed 
A. Narrowly enough to prevent reliability from being established 
only by reference to evidence from a different and non-apposite 
part of the claimed domain of expertise; and 
B. Broadly enough to have some potential issue-settling or 
precedential carry-over effects in other cases within the class 
encompassed by the question (though this carry-over application 
would not necessarily have to be to a broad or common class in 
 
 129 Id. at 156-57 (citations omitted). 
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the real world).130 
In addition, when approaching this framing task, a court should 
remember that the Supreme Court has held that the main focus 
should be the reliability of the expertise as applied to and under the 
conditions of the case before the court.  This militates for the 
narrowest framing reasonable under the circumstances, and this is 
what we think our final framing of the Kumho Tire question 
accomplishes. 
3. Determining the belief warrant for “experience-based” expertise 
(“good reason to believe”) 
What could count as a good reason to believe the claims that 
underlie Carlson’s testimony?  We do not want to be unrealistically 
demanding in regard to claims of either experience-generated 
methodology or skills.  However, at the start there seem to be only 
two general approaches which might distinguish the reliable from the 
unreliable when such claims are made: either we trust the experience 
of the claimant because the claimant appears to trust it, or we look 
for something more.  Given the human capacity for self-delusion 
which we have all observed, the former would not appear to have 
much to recommend it, and indeed the Supreme Court itself has 
rejected the “ipse dixit of the expert” alone as a basis for a rational 
belief warrant.131  Then what “something more” might suffice? 
Before approaching this question, we must assert one great 
guiding principle which we believe to be the most powerful lens that 
can be brought to bear in judging circumstances put forth as 
supplying that “something more.”  At the very least, every such 
candidate for the “something more” which can provide a belief 
warrant for experience-based methodology or skill, must be capable 
of passing the “astrology test”; that is, it must be something that 
astrologers could not plausibly assert in regard to their claims.132  We 
have picked astrology because it was one of the two areas actually 
named in Kumho Tire as areas “lacking reliability” generally, and 
because, unlike the other area (necromancy), astrology still has a 
large group of believers and a community of practitioners with organs 
of publication and guild-like groups which can provide the form, if 
not the substance, of publication, general acceptance, and 
 
 130 The judicial system will demand some precedential effect, and rightly so on 
efficiency grounds, though a precedent system does not fit well with the open-ended 
and dynamic nature of many empirical questions.  But that is a topic for another day. 
 131 Id. at 157 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)). 
 132 See Risinger, Task at Hand, supra note 61, at 776. 
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conformity to community norms of good practice which are claimed 
to enhance accuracy.  This point has immediate relevance in that, just 
as individual self-belief cannot provide an adequate belief warrant for 
others, the mutual self-belief of a group is similarly insufficient.  
Thus, showing conformity with group practice, without more, is not 
enough.  This is the main weakness of both the “general acceptance” 
test133 and the “equal intellectual rigor” test134 that are sometimes put 
forth as generally sufficient grounds for a belief in the reliability of 
particular testimony.  Some claims that pass muster under those tests 
cannot pass the “astrology test.”  This was recognized by the Supreme 
Court itself in Kumho Tire when it said that such factors were not in 
themselves sufficient when the claim is that the discipline itself “lacks 
reliability.”135 
With this in mind, let us continue to examine what kinds of 
information can yield a proper belief warrant for a claim of 
experience-based methods or skills beyond self-belief.  There appear 
to be two main sources of such information: practical success and 
scientific testing of claims.  It should not be too surprising that we 
believe that actual scientific testing of claims is epistemically 
privileged, and trumps all when it has been done and done properly.  
However, like epidemiology in the case of risk-increase causation in 
toxic tort, such testing is expensive and difficult to do across the 
whole range of claimed practical areas of expertise that are proffered 
in legal proceedings.  In the absence of high-quality testing, are there 
ever any circumstances that can take its place and provide adequate 
belief warrants for the purposes of the law? 
In regard to claimed expertise at determining specific facts, at 
any rate,136 there would seem to be two necessary conditions for such 
a belief warrant: first, that in the ordinary practice of the claimed 
methodology or skill, there are objectively unmistakable right and 
wrong results in most cases of application, and second, that there is a 
 
 133 See Peter B. Oh, Assessing Admissibility of Nonscientific Expert Evidence Under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 556, 565-67 (1997) (explicitly advocating Frye 
test for non-scientific evidence). 
 134 This test would only require that the expert have utilized the same intellectual 
rigor in reaching conclusions for use in court as that used for reaching conclusions 
in non-forensic settings.  See J. Brook Lathram, The “Same Intellectual Rigor” Test 
Provides an Effective Method for Determining the Reliability of All Expert Testimony, Without 
Regard to Whether the Testimony Comprises “Scientific Knowledge” or “Technical or Other 
Specialized Knowledge,” 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 1053, 1063-68 (1998). 
 135 526 U.S. at 151. 
 136 Weaker warrants may suffice in regard to some subjects including “no one 
right answer” areas such as land valuation.  See Risinger, Taxonomy, supra note 37; see 
also supra note 96. 
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generally inescapable penalty for wrong results.  Under these 
circumstances, it is at least tenable, at any rate, to believe that humans 
may develop generally reliable practical methods and skills.  Though 
the practitioners may not be able to give any useful account of the 
reasons for their success (being only what would have been called in 
an earlier time “mere empericks”), if all the law cares about is the 
success of the methods and skills developed in such circumstances,137 
then the judgments of such cooks (or beekeepers, or chicken sexers) 
may be proper candidates for admission into evidence. 
Of course, clearly apparent right or wrong results, and 
unambiguous feedback regarding success or failure, are only necessary 
conditions for a belief warrant about experience-based methods or 
skills; they are not in themselves always sufficient.  There are other 
conditions which may reinforce or undermine reliability even in the 
presence of such conditions, and therefore affect both the tenability 
of belief warrants and the question of admissibility under Rule 702.  
However, that is an issue for another day.  What we are mainly 
interested in here are those areas of claimed experience-based skill or 
practice that do not operate under such conditions of success-or-
failure feedback.  What may be said of belief warrants for experience-
based claims like these? 
When one reflects upon it, it is surprising how many experience-
based claims offered in court (including that of Carlson in Kumho 
Tire, as we shall see) fit this model.  For instance, it is true of nearly all 
the forensic identification “sciences” based on subjective human 
evaluation, such as bitemark, toolmark, and handwriting 
identification analysis.  In the normal practice of these areas, there is 
no clear objective index of mistaken results.  The practitioners do not 
ordinarily have empirically unmistakable feedback about the accuracy 
of the majority of their skill-based decisions or applications of 
method.  And so it was with Carlson.  There was no independent way 
for him ever to know in fact if there was a manufacturing defect in 
the Carmichael tire, or any other tire, when he had finished applying 
his methodology and coming to his conclusion.  There was no way for 
inaccurate conclusions to manifest themselves independently, and for 
Carlson to suffer for them, and learn from them.  In such 
 
 137 Or by extension, the accuracy of such skills acquired through training in guilds 
which have accumulated the results of such circumstances into teachable practical 
models.  For a full treatment of the implications and problems of such a “guild” 
claim, which may often masquerade as “science,” see D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. 
Denbeaux & Michael J. Saks, Brave New “Post-Daubert World”—A Reply to Professor 
Moenssens, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 405, 441-47 (1998) [hereinafter Risinger et al., 
“Post-Daubert World”]. 
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circumstances, experience itself (no matter how extensive) cannot 
provide a proper belief warrant for the accuracy or reliability of a 
process or a witness. 
Does this mean that no such witness can ever be shown to be 
reliable in what they are claiming to be able to do?  No, but in the 
absence of a clear accuracy feedback loop, the only thing that can 
supply a proper belief warrant is testing, properly designed and 
administered according to the normal standards of science.  In 
addition, it is important to keep in mind that any assertion that such 
testing has been done must be examined carefully, to make sure that 
the tests themselves are not only internally valid, but actually test 
something close enough to the skill claimed in court so that the tests 
have reasonable external validity in regard to that skill.  And this 
depends not only on the broad or narrow characterization of the skill 
or experience-based methodology but also on the differences 
between test conditions and the conditions of ordinary practice. 
The latter point requires a bit of exposition.  The emphasis in 
Kumho Tire is on reliability of the expertise in the circumstances of 
the case.  New Rule 702 requires that proffered expertise be the 
product “of reliable methods.”138  Elsewhere, one of us and his co-
authors have been at some pains to establish that there is one 
enormous reliability-undermining condition which applies to all 
expertise, but most heavily distorts expertise which is experience-
based and relies on human subjective judgment.139  We refer to so-
called “observer effects,” particularly those which result from 
conditions giving rise to expectation and suggestion from which the 
expert has not been insulated by appropriate masking techniques.  In 
addition, much research indicates that the distortions resulting from 
such unmasked suggestion and expectancy are reinforced 
significantly by the kind of team identification and desire to win 
which are virtually inevitable in the adversary process.140  Testing of 
the reliability of skills which has been done in settings without such 
variables (which would be the norm in the usual design of such tests) 
cannot establish that the skills survive in the presence of the 
precursors of such effects. 
In any area where normal practice can be adjusted to eliminate 
these effects by masking or blind testing regimes, courts should 
 
 138 FED. R. EVID. 702(2).  This rule, which became effective on December 1, 2000, 
requires, inter alia, that in order to be admissible, expert testimony must be “the 
product of reliable principles and methods.”  Id. 
 139 See generally Risinger et al., Observer Effects, supra note 18. 
 140 Id. at 18-19, 24-27. 
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consider the failure to do so in determining the reliability of 
proffered testimony, even when some arguable relevant test data 
under blind conditions are available.141  However, masking is not an 
option in regard to some kinds of expertise.  For example, in regard 
to accident reconstruction, the precursors of observer effects are 
likely to be present as long as the experts know who hired them, and 
this circumstance is appropriate in determining the discount to 
impose on any available skills test results. 
Of course, in Carlson’s case, things were easy.  There had been 
no tests of any kind of his four-variable “two factor” methodology, nor 
of him individually as an accurate subjective evaluator.  When dealing 
with an experience-based expertise which has no accuracy feedback 
loop and no even arguably relevant test data, the admissibility 
question should answer itself: ex nihilo nihil fit.  And so it did in Kumho 
Tire. 
4. Determining the legal standard of certainty for the belief warrant 
(“reliable enough for the purposes of the law”) 
This question need not detain us long in regard to the kind of 
issue presented by Mr. Carlson.  What we have said in regard to risk-
increase causation is equally applicable here.  Carlson’s claimed 
expertise was proffered in a civil case.  It dealt with “drawing a 
conclusion” or “giving an opinion,” that is, translating the meaning of 
one set of facts equally available to expert and factfinder into another 
non-obvious factual proposition.  It did not deal with any of the 
special areas of concern in the theory of expertise that involve 
economic or normative valuations of various kinds, which in different 
contexts can be the subject of special arguments about heightened or 
lowered standards of admissibility to discharge the law’s special 
purposes in regard to them.  It was not mere “educational” expertise, 
expertise used only to educate the jury to the potentially 
counterintuitive results of relevant research which might show that 
the jury’s general background “major premise”142 “social 
framework”143 “jury notice”144 information was deficient or inaccurate.  
 
 141 For a discussion of the feasibility of such masked regimes in forensic practice, 
see id. at 45-50. 
 142 That is, the major premises for which the specific evidence in the case provides 
minor premises for deductions about the ultimate facts in the individual case. 
 143 See Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social 
Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987). 
 144 See John H. Mansfield, Jury Notice, 74 GEO. L.J. 395 (1985).  These terms 
(“general background,” “major premise,” “social framework,” and “jury notice” are 
not independent, but essentially different labels attempting to capture the kind of 
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All of these cases present special questions for which a court might 
properly claim to exercise intelligent selection, appropriate to the 
kind of expertise, of both the appropriate belief warrant information 
and the required level of reliability for admission (the proper scope 
of the “discretion” and “flexibility” referred to in Kumho Tire).  
However, whenever a court is faced with a proffered expert 
exhibiting the same kinds of attributes as Carlson, the result should 
be the same as that reached by the Supreme Court in Kumho Tire, that 
is to say, exclusion.  However, in spite of Kumho Tire, this result is not 
always forthcoming, as we shall see when we examine the recent 
record of the lower courts in regard to prosecution-proffered forensic 
science identification expertise. 
THE IGNORING OF KUMHO TIRE WHEN PROSECUTION-PROFFERED 
EXPERTISE IS CHALLENGED 
A. The Handwriting Cases 
Like Mr. Carlson in Kumho Tire, and like other forensic 
identification specialties such as toolmark and bitemark 
identification, forensic document examiners who claim to identify 
handwriting by comparison of hands have no unambiguous feedback 
regarding right or wrong conclusions in normal practice.145  They also 
usually operate in non-blind conditions with no attempt to mask out 
the common precursors of observer effects resulting from 
expectation and suggestion.146  The only initial difference between 
their claims and those of Mr. Carlson is that there is a guild-like 
group of them who share the same beliefs and general methods of 
examination.147  But, as we have already indicated, the existence of a 
group practice, without more, does not provide sufficient warrant to 
believe the claims of the group, because such an approach fails the 
“astrology test.”  There is no a priori way to distinguish the basis for 
the handwriting expert’s group claims from an astrologer’s group 
claims.  As we have said, in regard to Carlson, astrology, and 
handwriting identification, only some regime of external testing can 
supply the “something else” which is required for a rational belief 
 
general information jurors are allowed of necessity to bring to their task from 
sources outside the courtroom.  See Risinger, Taxonomy, supra note 37, at 517 n.16 
and accompanying text. 
 145 For a discussion of this problem, see D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, 
Science and Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82 
IOWA L. REV. 21, 64 (1996). 
 146 Id. 
 147 See Risinger et al., “Post-Daubert World,” supra note 137, at 441-47. 
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warrant. 
What kind of testing regime is required is dependent in large 
part on the nature of the group claims being made.  There are three 
major variables: 
1. How many reasonably separable subtasks are performed by the 
group? 
2. What “experience-based” “subjective data base driven” “clinical” 
“subjective judgment” “skill”148 components are involved in each 
subtask? 
3. Under what conditions are these tasks usually performed? 
As to the first variable, the literature of the group under 
investigation is the primary source, though it cannot be entirely 
dispositive.  If, however (as is true in the case of handwriting),149 that 
literature identifies subtasks, or subsets of practice conditions which 
are taken to create situations of easier and more difficult 
performance, these are entitled to be taken at their word.  It may be 
that the outsider can supplement this system of subtask conditions 
with others not in the guild literature, but which may be reasonably 
likely, on other grounds, to affect results.  But it would seem to 
border on the ludicrous to treat such an area as involving a global 
unitary skill which can be proven to exist by any test of any task 
anywhere within its bounds.150  Unfortunately, this is exactly what 
most courts do, as we shall see. 
As to the second variable, when an experience-based subjective 
judgment component is admitted to be present in normal practice 
(as it was in Carlson’s case, and is in most “experience-based” claims 
of expertise, including handwriting identification), then defensibly 
designed tests must determine the reliability of that skill in 
 
 148 This litany is not intended to suggest that each term represents something 
different to be dealt with in each case.  It reflects terms which are almost 
synonymous, but which are in common usage and which capture slightly different 
aspects of the “experience-based expertise” phenomenon. 
 149 See Risinger, Task at Hand, supra note 61, at 782 n.69. 
 150 It is instructive to note the concurrence of Wigmore on the same point in 
slightly different terms: 
The capacity is in every case a relative one, i.e., relative to the topic about 
which the person is asked to make his statement.  The object is to be sure that 
the question to the witness will be answered by a person who is fitted to 
answer it.  His fitness, then, is fitness on that point.  He may be fitted to 
answer about countless other matters, but that does not justify 
accepting his views in the matter in hand. 
II JOHN H. WIGMORE, TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS 
AT COMMON LAW § 555, at 634 (3d ed. 1940); see also Risinger, Taxonomy, supra note 
37, at 510. 
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practitioners.  By far the most desirable form of such a testing regime 
would consist of individual proficiency testing which would generate 
accuracy scores for each subtask for each practitioner, like the 
“personal equations” of nineteenth century astronomy.151  The 
Australian document examiners and science-trained researchers 
Bryan Found and Doug Rogers, and their collaborators at the 
Forensic Expertise Profiling Laboratory at La Trobe University, have 
begun developing a testing regime like that for Australian document 
examiners, though the effort is still in its infancy.152  Unfortunately, in 
this country, there is no such system of individual proficiency testing, 
at least none with known results.153  The next best thing would be a 
system of group proficiency tests for each subtask.  The weakness of 
such an approach is that, even if the group is successful, it ascribes 
the average performance for the group to both the group’s strongest 
and (more troublingly) its weakest performers.154  This is especially a 
problem when only what are believed to be the strongest performers 
are selected to take the group proficiency tests.  Finally, while 
unacceptable performance might be determined from tests of the 
claimed experts alone, acceptable performance for the purposes of 
the law is dependent on a marginal advantage in accuracy over the 
jury, so tests must also be administered to appropriately selected lay 
groups to determine the existence of such an advantage.155 
We have already written fairly extensively about the weaknesses 
of handwriting identification expertise.156  When we started, we 
characterized the conclusions concerning such claims flowing from 
anything that could be called formal data as either mildly negative, or 
 
 151 Personal equations were corrections worked out in the early nineteenth 
century for observational bias in astronomical observers which turned out to be fairly 
stable for each observer.  For a description of the personal equation phenomenon, 
see EDWARD G. BORING, A HISTORY OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 134-35 (1929). 
 152 See Bryan Found & Doug Rogers, Revision and Corrective Action Package: Signature 
Trial 2001 (distributed on CD-ROM by the Forensic Expertise Profiling Laboratory, 
School of Human Biosciences, La Trobe University, Australia) (described fully in the 
2003 supplement to D. Michael Risinger, Handwriting Identification, in 3 DAVID L. 
FAIGMAN, DAVID H. KAY, MICHAEL J. SAKS & JOSEPH SANDERS, MODERN SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE 400-83 (2d ed. 2002), and in Jodi Sita, Bryan Found, & Douglas K. Rogers, 
Forensic Handwriting Examiners’ Expertise for Signature Comparison, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 
1117 (2002)). 
 153 We say “with known results” because law enforcement laboratories may have 
internal proficiency tests, the existence and results of which they keep secret.  This 
was apparently the case in regard to fingerprinting.  See infra note 201. 
 154 This is the problem with most of the extant American research on document 
examiner skill in handwriting identification, particularly that done by Moshe Kam 
and his associates.  See the extensive discussion in Risinger, supra note 152. 
 155 Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 38, at 731, 734-35. 
 156 See writings previously cited at notes 37, 38, 53, 61, 137, 145, and 152. 
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nonexistent, depending on one’s attitude about both the internal 
and external validity of the data generated by the proficiency tests 
sponsored by the Forensic Science Foundation.157  Since then there 
has been some formal research undertaken.158  However, when 
compared to the extent of research devoted to many other areas of 
endeavor, the amount of research devoted to handwriting 
identification expertise remains sparse.  Nevertheless, even taking the 
extant research at face value, two things are clear.  Most of it was 
undertaken under test designs which appear to have been specially 
tailored to make it impossible to make direct statements about 
individual performance.159  In addition, most of it is directed, at best, 
to showing an average advantage of document examiners over lay 
persons in regard to what are, in the aggregate, the easiest possible 
subtasks.  No attempt is made to determine the error rate for 
document examiners for the more difficult tasks, which are the tasks 
commonly at issue in actual criminal prosecutions.  Even the studies 
which have been directed toward a definable subtask have all been 
directed toward the subtask regarded as one of the easiest subtasks in 
the claimed expertise’s own literature—determining whether a 
signature was written by the person whose name is reflected, or by 
some other person inexperienced as a forger.160  What have never 
been subjected to any tests are the two most common subtasks at 
issue in criminal prosecutions: attribution of authorship of block 
printing and attribution of the authorship of a forged signature to a 
person whose name is not reflected by the signature (relying only on 
the characteristics of the few letters in the signature, which often 
reflect some attempt at disguise.)  And, as a follow-on to this issue, no 
empirical work at all has been done on the problem of determining 
how much “questioned” writing is necessary to perform any 
 
 157 Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 38, at 750-51. 
 158 The extant research is fully recounted and analyzed in Risinger, supra note 152 
and supplements. 
 159 This is especially true of the first three Kam studies: Moshe Kam, Joseph 
Wetstein & Robert Conn, Proficiency of Professional Document Examiners in Writer 
Identification, 39 J. FORENSIC SCI. 5 (1994) [hereinafter Kam I]; Moshe Kam, Gabriel 
Fielding & Robert Conn, Writer Identification by Professional Document Examiners, 42 J. 
FORENSIC SCI. 778 (1997) [hereinafter Kam II]; and Moshe Kam, Gabriel Fielding & 
Robert Conn, The Effects of Monetary Incentives on Performance of Nonprofessionals in 
Document-Examination Proficiency Tests, 43 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1000 (1998) [hereinafter 
Kam III].  Each of those studies has a complex design which insures that no two tests 
administered are exactly the same, so that group performances can be compared but 
comparisons of individual performances are undermined. 
 160 That is true of both Moshe Kam, Kishore Gummadidala, Gabriel Fielding & 
Robert Conn, Signature Authentication by Forensic Document Examiners, 46 J. FORENSIC 
SCI. 884 (2001) [hereinafter Kam IV] and Sita et al., supra note 152. 
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identifications accurately—one letter?  A capital “Q” but not a lower 
case “o”?  One word?  Thirty letters?  There is simply no empirical 
evidence at all on this boundary problem, that is, on the variables 
that determine the threshold of reliability of the claimed skill, 
assuming it exists at all (when there is both plenty of questioned 
writing and plenty of known writing of the putative author). 
As for the third variable, tests ought to attempt to simulate the 
conditions of actual practice as much as possible.  Unfortunately, the 
conditions of actual practice are not always easy to determine, and 
the information that does exist suggests altogether less control and 
fewer masking protocols than would be the usual norm in the 
practice of science.161  This makes it difficult to design tests which 
demonstrate that any skills revealed by the tests (which of necessity 
must be masked to a great extent) are robust enough for their 
accuracy to survive the confounding conditions of actual practice.  In 
theory, tests of this question could be designed, but to date there are 
none.  This leaves the results of such tests as there are with a giant 
problem of external validity on that ground.  It would be nice if we 
could make this problem go away by introducing adequate masking 
or blind testing procedures into forensic practice,162 but so far 
nothing of this sort has been done. 
It would seem that, as a minimum, Kumho Tire would require any 
judge facing a Rule 702 reliability challenge to handwriting 
identification expertise to do what the Supreme Court did in Kumho 
Tire in regard to Carlson, that is, identify the particular sub-task which 
is at issue under the facts of the case and the attendant skill claims 
involved, and then to look to the empirical record to see what 
support there is for the claim that a document examiner can reliably 
perform that task, by the methods employed, given the conditions 
under which they were employed.  So how have judges measured up 
to this ideal since the decision in Kumho Tire? 
Since Kumho Tire there have been twenty-one available163 federal 
court decisions on challenges to proffered handwriting identification 
expertise.164  Eight are appellate decisions,165 seven of which affirmed 
 
 161 Risinger et al., Observer Effects, supra note 18, at 35-42. 
 162 See id. at 45-52. 
 163 We have counted as “available” all decisions in written form which have come 
into our hands, whether reflected on databases or counted as “reported” by local 
rules, or not. 
 164 United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Mooney, 
315 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. Kehoe, 310 F.3d 579 (8th Cir. 2002); 
United States v. Hernandez, No. 01-1194, 2002 WL 1335595 (10th Cir. June 19, 
2002); United States v. Johnson, 30 Fed. Appx. 686 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. 
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trial court global consideration and subsequent admission of such 
testimony, and one of which affirmed trial court admission of such 
testimony but restricted the expert from testifying to the conclusion 
of identity.166  The district court cases generated no available opinions 
in those cases, and the appellate decisions all managed to find no 
abuse of discretion without describing the particular claim of 
expertise which was at stake in the case. 
Of the remaining thirteen trial court cases, only two have come 
close to the ideal of identifying the “task at hand,”167 and, analyzing 
reliability with reference to that task, they both excluded the 
proffered testimony completely.  A third case excluded the proffered 
testimony without any particularized analysis,168 and a fourth 
exclusion was based on the failure of the government to proffer 
witnesses at the Daubert hearing with sufficient familiarity with the 
empirical record to testify.169  In the other nine district court cases, 
five admitted the proffered expertise only with significant 
limitations170 (a testament, perhaps, to the weakness of the empirical 
record in regard to the reliability of handwriting identification 
expertise even considered globally), and the other four admitted the 
 
Battle, No. 98-3246, 1999 WL 596966 (10th Cir. Aug. 6, 1999); United States v. Paul, 
175 F.3d 906 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hidalgo, No. CR-01-1011-PHX-FJM 
(D. Ariz. Nov. 6, 2002); United States v. Prime, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (W.D. Wash. 
2002); United State v. Lewis, Crim. Action No. 2:02-00042, 2002 WL 31055185 
(S.D.W. Va. Sept. 11, 2002); United States v. Nadurath, No. 4:02-CR-32-A, 2002 WL 
1000929 (N.D. Tex. May 14, 2002); United States v. Gricco, Crim. Action No. 01-90, 
2002 WL 746037 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2002); United States v. Brewer, No. 01 CR 892, 
2002 WL 596365 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2002); United States v. Richmond, Crim. Action 
No. 00-321 Section “N,” 2001 WL 1117235 (E.D. La. Sept. 21, 2001); United States v. 
Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (D. Alaska 2001); United States v. Fujii, 152 F. Supp. 2d 
939 (N.D. Ill. 2000); United States v. Rutherford, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D. Neb. 
2000); United States v. Santillan, No. CR-96-40169 DLJ, 1999 WL 1201765 (N.D. Cal. 
Dec. 3, 1999); United States v. Brown, No. CR 99-184 ABC (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 1999); 
United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999); United States v. Elmore, 56 
M.J. 533 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2001). 
 165 Seven of the cases are from the courts of appeal and one is from the military 
court of appeal.  See Crisp, 324 F.3d 261; Mooney, 315 F.3d 54; Kehoe, 310 F.3d 579; 
Hernandez, 2002 WL 1335595; Johnson, 30 Fed. Appx. 686; Battle, 1999 WL 596966; 
Paul, 175 F.3d 906; Elmore, 56 M.J. 533. 
 166 Hernandez, 2002 WL 1335595.  The court of appeals seemed puzzled at the 
restrictive approach, which was borrowed from United States v. Hines.  See Hernandez, 
2002 WL 133559, at *2. 
 167 Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1097; Fujii, 152 F. Supp. 2d 939. 
 168 Brewer, 2002 WL 596365. 
 169 Lewis, 2002 WL 31055185.  The government in this case pushed the limits of 
expert qualification too far even for a Daubert hearing. 
 170 Hidalgo, No. CR-01-1011-PHX-FJM (D. Ariz. Nov. 6, 2002); Rutherford, 104 F. 
Supp. 2d 1190; Santillan, 1999 WL 1201765; Brown, No. CR 99-184 ABC (C.D. Cal. 
Dec. 1, 1999); Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62. 
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testimony globally.171 
At least four172 (and perhaps many more, since the opinions 
often do not give sufficient detail to determine) of the nineteen 
opinions admitting the proffered testimony (with or without 
restrictions) involved the kind of subtask or boundary problems 
described above.  But in none of those cases was the subtask problems 
identified, nor did they have an explicit effect on the outcome.  
Indeed, somewhat ironically, one of the four exclusions in this set of 
cases was a violation of Kumho Tire’s requirements, invoking the 
precedent of two of the other exclusions without checking to see if 
their grounds of exclusion applied to the case before the court (they 
didn’t).173  So the bulk of district courts, whatever else they may be 
doing, are not performing very well under the requirements of 
Kumho Tire, and as a result, testimony on many subtasks of 
questionable reliability is being allowed in front of the jury. 
This same pattern is not restricted to handwriting identification 
cases.  An examination of all the reported opinions in criminal cases 
since the decision in Kumho Tire shows that there is only one area 
which has gotten substantially more attention since that decision than 
it did before, and that is fingerprint identification, that ne plus ultra of 
claimed perfection in the forensic identification disciplines.  What 
comes of asking the wrong question can have no better illustration 
than that which comes from a consideration of the fingerprint 
challenges in general, and from the most famous of those cases, the 
case of Carlos Ivan Lllera Plaza, in particular. 
B. The Fingerprint Cases 
Judge Pollak’s two conflicting opinions in United States v. Llera 
Plaza174 are by now the stuff of legend.  Much has been written on 
them already.  However, both of those opinions and what has been 
written about them seem generally to have missed the point.  Both 
opinions are stark violations of the approach mandated by Kumho 
Tire.  One can read both opinions until the last trump is sounded, 
 
 171 Prime, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1203; Nadurath, 2002 WL 1000929; Gricco, 2002 WL 
746037; Richmond, 2001 WL 1117235. 
 172 Battle, 1999 WL 596966; Rutherford, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1190; Brown, No. CR 99-184 
ABC (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 1999); Elmore, 56 M.J. 533. 
 173 Brewer, 2002 WL 596365.  It might shock some of our critics in the forensic 
science community to realize it, but we consider exclusion in this manner as 
erroneous as admission. 
 174 United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002) [hereinafter 
Llera Plaza I]; United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002) 
[hereinafter Llera Plaza II]. 
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and never have an inkling about the “task at hand,” as defined by the 
particular factual circumstances to which the claimed expertise was 
applied in Llera Plaza’s actual case (the “target issue,” in our terms).  
In order to understand why such formulation was critically important 
in this case (aside from the fact that it seems to have been mandated 
by the Supreme Court of the United States), we must give a quick 
review of fingerprint theory and practice and the issues attendant to 
it. 
Putting aside the overblown nineteenth century language of 
absolute uniqueness in which the claims of fingerprint identification 
are usually expressed, the main claim may be reformulated in more 
acceptable modern terminology, thus: Human skin contains a fairly 
sizable extent of ridged skin on the palms and fingers of the hands 
and the soles and toes of the feet.  The usual theoretical account for 
its function is that the ridges increase friction on the surfaces,175 
where increased friction for traction and gripping would be of 
survival benefit.  Such work as has been done on the subject indicates 
that the pattern of ridges in any given individual is constant 
throughout life.176  Setting aside the question of whether no two 
people share the “exact” same pattern of ridges and perceptible 
detail associated with them, it is clear that not every person has the 
same pattern of ridges as every other person across the entire extent 
of their ridged skin.  Indeed, though surprisingly little defensible 
formal research has been done on the question, it seems apparent 
enough from anecdotal information that variation is so common that 
“exact matches” across the entire range of ridged skin are vanishingly 
rare (if they occur at all in the human population now alive).  There 
is apparently some mechanism at work in the fetal development stage 
which triggers the generation of the ridges by a process that exhibits 
a fair amount of randomness at a fine level of organization and 
detail177 (though the patterns fit general categories of pattern at a 
 
 175 Llera Plaza I, 179 F. Supp. 2d. at 495-96 (quoting the testimony of Dr. William 
Babler, President of the American Dermatoglyphics Association, given in United States 
v. Mitchell, 199 F. Supp. 2d 820 (E.D. Pa. 2002)); see SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT 
IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION 108 (2001). 
 176 Llera Plaza I, 179 F. Supp. 2d. at 495-96 (reporting Babler’s testimony); David 
A. Stoney, The Scientific Basis of Expert Testimony on Fingerprint Identification, in 3 DAVID 
L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 27-2.2.1, at 383 (2d ed. 2002) 
[hereinafter Stoney, Scientific Basis]. 
 177 A start is being made at understanding how various processes, including 
biological processes, can generate self-organizing patterns, displaying such a 
combination of order and randomness by beginning with a set of relatively simple 
conditions and subjecting them to fairly simple algorithms which instantiate both 
positive and negative feedback.  See Scott Camazine, Patterns in Nature, 112 NATURAL 
HISTORY 34, 40 (2003).  See generally SCOTT CAMAZINE, SELF-ORGANIZATION IN 
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grosser level of examination).178  However, because the ridges are 
generally curvilinear in complex ways, describing the amount of 
randomness and the likelihood of a random match is a daunting 
theoretical problem.179  Even describing what constitutes a match is a 
problem, because, contrary to popular belief, matches are often not 
manifested in anything resembling perfect superimposability.  The 
curved and deformable nature of surfaces upon which prints of 
ridged skin may be left, and the deformable nature of skin itself, 
often defeats exact superimposition, so that even with prints 
reflecting large extents of ridges, matching may be an exercise in 
complex topographical judgment in accounting for such (usually 
mild but perceptible) deformities preventing superimposition.180 
So, while the formal research necessary to justify such a 
statement with formal data has not been done, and the empirical and 
theoretical work which would give a proper explanatory account of 
the mechanism behind the organization of ridged skin has not been 
done,181 it seems uncontroversial in any serious way to say that the 
amount of randomness in ridge organization is such that “no two 
people” share the same pattern in a confusable way across the entire 
extent of their ridged skin.  We do not, however, use the entire 
extent of ridged skin for identification purposes.  Partly because of 
convenience in “rolling” such prints and partly because it is the print 
most likely to be left on a surface inadvertently, we use only the 
ridged skin on the balls of the fingers.  The standard practice known 
to everyone who has ever been “fingerprinted” is to ink the balls of 
the fingers and roll them onto a card in boxes marked out for each 
digit.  The result is a set of ten prints of known orientation 
comprising about one square-inch each, for a total of roughly ten 
square-inches of ridged skin.182  Again, as in the case of the entire 
extent of ridged skin, the formal research necessary to establish 
random match probabilities for two sets of ten prints from different 
people has not been done, but it seems fair to conclude that such 
probability is sufficiently minuscule not to trouble the practical 
certainty which we seek in the law.  When an unidentified body is 
 
BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS (2001). 
 178 See COLE, supra note 175, at 114. 
 179 Id. at 260; David A. Stoney, Measurement of Fingerprint Individuality, in ADVANCES 
IN FINGERPRINT TECHNOLOGY (Henry C. Lee & Robert E. Gaensslen eds., 2001); David 
A. Stoney & John I. Thornton, A Critical Analysis of Quantitative Fingerprint 
Individuality Models, 31 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1187 (1986). 
 180 Stoney, Scientific Basis, supra note 176, § 27-2.2.5. 
 181 Or is just beginning.  See supra note 177. 
 182 Llera Plaza I, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 496 (discussing testimony of David Ashbaugh). 
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found, and a ten print card is rolled from the fingers of the corpse, 
and it is found to match one on file with a law enforcement agency, 
doubts about the belief warrant for the identification would seem 
trivial. 
At the other extreme, however, it is clear that there is a lower 
limit of certainty.  If a glass found in a room where a murder had 
been committed had a smudge on it which showed clearly only one 
portion of one ridge one sixty-fourth of an inch long (a very “partial,” 
“latent print”), neither its curvature nor any microscopic detail 
connected with it would allow a confident identification.  Since no 
one knows its orientation, or which digit it came from, it would have 
to be compared with every short length of every ridge on every print 
of a candidate card, and no one knows exactly how many such short 
lengths of a ridge might match it in any randomly selected ten-print 
card. 
So, in regard to the admissibility of fingerprint identification, 
there would seem to be two potential issues of reliability, one trivial 
and one extremely important.  The first would challenge the 
admissibility of any identification derived from fingerprint 
comparison, on the ground that without formal research and 
quantified statistical modeling, its reliability could not be established.  
Such a challenge is puckish, quixotic, and in some ways constructive, 
but in others not.183  In the end, it is doomed to failure, and not 
simply for the wrong reasons either.  First, there has been a little 
empirical study that tends to indicate that, at least in regard to large 
clear areas of ridged skin, variability is large and coincidental matches 
are at least very rare.184  Second, the extensive use of ten-print 
comparisons for identification of unknown persons followed by later 
confirmation of identity from other sources and no known record of 
error can be said to form a practical accuracy feedback loop unique 
 
 183 Such positions can be used to paint all critics of forensic science as radical 
bomb-throwers and extremists deserving of small consideration.  For a milder and 
more nuanced, but still (in our view) much too global version of a similar argument, 
see Edward J. Imwinkelried, Flawed Expert Testimony: Striking the Right Balance in 
Admissibility Standards, 18 CRIM. JUST. 28 (2003), which asserts that critics demand 
unreasonable global exclusion, and apparently argues for (to our minds) 
unreasonably global admission. 
 184 The so-called “50k x 50k study” testified to by Donald Ziesig of Lockheed 
Martin Information Systems, which computer-compared each of 50,000 individual 
rolled loop class prints from white males with each other, was such a study.  See Llera 
Plaza I, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 497.  This study is referred to in S.B. Meagher, B. Budowle 
& D. Ziesig, 50K vs. 50K Fingerprint Comparison Test (1999) (unpublished), in Stoney, 
Scientific Basis, supra note 176, § 27-2.1.2[6], at 381 n.12, and must be taken with 
something of a grain of salt, since it was FBI-commissioned and appears never to 
have been published. 
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among forensic identification techniques.185  While more defensible 
research is to be encouraged, a global challenge to the reliability of 
all fingerprint identification is a non-starter. 
The second potential challenge is the important one.  It is based 
on the boundary problem described above: identification of a 
practical threshold of reliability for “partial prints.”  What standards 
should be applied to ensure that identifications from a small area of 
print found at a crime scene are sufficiently reliable for purposes of 
the criminal law?  Here, the absence of formal data ought to be more 
troubling under Daubert and Kumho Tire.  This is especially true 
because fingerprint experts either disagree on how to characterize 
the threshold of reliability, or more commonly, claim that such a 
threshold cannot be described at all.186  This is the result of the 
addition to fingerprint examination over the last decades of new 
sources of information (often now collectively referred to under the 
title “ridgeology”)187 which makes old thresholds fail in some 
circumstances.188 
Extensive clear prints such as ten-print cards might be quickly 
matchable by general pattern at the first general level of observation 
(sometimes called “the first level of analysis”),189 and confirmed by 
 
 185 Stoney, Scientific Basis, supra note 176, § 27-2.3.2. 
 186 COLE, supra note 175, at 262-63; Stoney, Scientific Basis, supra note 176, § 27-
2.3.1[2]. 
 187 “Ridgeology” as a term appears traceable to a 1983 pamphlet by David 
Ashbaugh, a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, entitled “Ridgeology.”  
The specific detail to which he referred, such as the presence of pores and 
characteristics of curvature, had been known and considered for some time (the use 
of pores even has its own term, “poroscopy”), but Ashbaugh’s radical claim that 
identification was always a gestalt which could never be subject to any threshold 
system of points (which had been foreshadowed by a resolution of the International 
Association of Identification, the leading organization of fingerprint examiners) was 
embraced by many.  See COLE, supra note 175, at 261-66. 
 188 Or rather, which makes old thresholds overly conservative in the eyes of some. 
COLE, supra note 175, at 263. 
 189 Llera Plaza I, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 496 (referring to “first level of detail”).  This is 
all part of what is now billed as the “ACE-V” methodology, a “methodology” so 
lacking in methodological detail as to be, upon reflection, nearly hilarious.  The A 
stands for “assess,” that is, look at a latent print and decide whether it is too smudged 
or small even to try to analyze it, and whether any apparent detail ought to be 
ignored because it represents a “double tapped” or overlapping print.  The C stands 
for “comparison,” and that means, well, the examiner is to compare the known and 
the latent print, though there are apparently no fixed standards for performing such 
a comparison.  Rather, it is based “on the training and experience of the examiner.”  
The E stands for “evaluation,” which means that the examiner decides if the two are 
similar enough to declare that they are a match, without reference to any particular 
notion of minimum points of correspondence, and V stands for “validation,” which is 
a non-blind checking of the first examiner’s work by a second examiner.  This is the 
“scientific technique” which the government in Llera Plaza argued “met all four of 
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correspondence of individual landmarks (often called minutiae)190 at 
the next level of magnification (often called the “second level of 
analysis”).191  These landmarks were the Galton192 solution to the 
curvilinear nature of ridges, identifications of characteristics which 
could serve as discrete units of analysis, such as the point where one 
ridge divides into two (often called a “bifurcation”), or the division of 
two ridges followed by their closure again (a “lake”), etc.193  The 
correspondence of such landmarks, the number of ridges separating 
them, and the relative direction and distance of their separation, are 
traditionally the stuff of determining the “number of points of 
comparison” between two prints.  However, at yet higher 
magnification (referred to sometimes as “third level analysis”),194 a 
clear print will show yet more supplementary information detail, 
including the width and shoreline of individual stretches of ridge, 
and the presence of pores separated by variable distances.  Herein 
lies the rub.  Traditional reliability thresholds typically required from 
seven to sixteen landmark points of comparison, with no unexplained 
differences.195  Adding the third level of magnification means, 
according to most examiners, that fewer traditional points are 
necessary in a clear print because the new detail can make up for 
fewer landmarks in individual cases.196  Why the new details of 
ridgeology cannot simply be assimilated into the “points of 
comparison” available to make up a conservative quantified 
minimum is not completely clear.197  Given the subjective nature of 
 
the Daubert guidelines.”  Llera Plaza II, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 560.  Judge Pollak found 
ACE-V not to be “scientific,” but appears to have taken it seriously as a 
“methodology.”  Id. at 561-69. 
 190 Traditionally (per Sir Francis Galton) the term “minutiae” (singular, 
“minutia”) was synonymous with “Galton points.”  See Stoney, Scientific Basis, supra 
note 176, § 27-2.1.2[5]; see also COLE, supra note 175, at 79-80.  There may be a trend 
toward applying the term to the even smaller “third level” detail.  See Llera Plaza I, 179 
F. Supp. 2d at 500 (attributing similar terminology to FBI Fingerprint Unit Chief 
Stephen Meagher). 
 191 Llera Plaza I, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 496 (referring to “level two detail”). 
 192 British biostatistician, geneticist, eugenicist and fingerprint pioneer Sir Francis 
Galton (1822-1911).  See COLE, supra note 175, at 79-80. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Stoney, Scientific Basis, supra note 176, § 27-2.1.2[5]. 
 196 Id. 
 197 The argument seems to have two aspects.  First, some landmarks, such as a 
“trifurcation,” are so rare that their presence even without much else might be 
enough for confident identification.  Second, the process is claimed to be a 
subjective gestalt process which is not rationally subject to universal thresholds made 
up of specified criteria.  See id.  While the latter may actually describe what examiners 
do, it would seem desirable to hold them to some sort of statable minimum even at 
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the evaluation at the boundary, the necessity, for the purposes of the 
law, of a mandated threshold in some form would seem most 
consistent with the policies of Daubert, Kumho, Rule 702, and the 
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the criminal law.  
This is especially true because such evaluations at the boundary are 
usually performed without any masking protocols to prevent 
suggestion or expectation from affecting the results, and without any 
line-up type foils which, in this area, could be easily supplied.198  
However, again consistent with Kumho Tire, such determinations of 
the appropriate reliability threshold should be dealt with in cases 
which arguably present specific examples of the boundary problem.  
And here is where Judge Pollak crashed.  As we said previously, 
nowhere in either opinion does he tell us anything about the nature 
and extent of the latent fingerprints under examination in Llera 
Plaza’s case.  In the first opinion (Llera Plaza I) he prepares a hash 
comprised of ruminations on global reliability, the threshold 
problem and the lack of formal research, concluding that because of 
the lack of formal data, fingerprint identification globally can never 
support testimony by an examiner concerning actual identification, 
presumably even in a ten-print comparison.199  Rather than excluding 
them from the courtroom completely, however, he applies the 
universal solvent du jour and declares that they may function as 
“Hines” witnesses, pointing out similarities but rendering no 
conclusion.200  How a jury would be qualified by experience to 
evaluate such testimony as to fingerprint correspondences was left 
unclear. 
For whatever reasons,201 Judge Pollak reversed himself two 
 
the cost of giving up the occasional accurate identification in court.  (Such 
information could of course still be used as an investigative lead.) 
 198 See Risinger et al., Observer Effects, supra note 18, at 43. 
 199 This was based on a determination that the “AC” part of the “ACE-V” 
“methodology” was objective, but the “E” (for evaluation) part was too subjective to 
(ever) be reliable.  Llera Plaza I, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 516. 
 200 So called based on the similar decision of Judge Gertner in regard to 
handwriting identification testimony in United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. 
Mass 1999), upon which Judge Pollak explicitly relied.  Llera Plaza I, 179 F. Supp. 2d 
at 517. 
 201 One could fill a book with speculations about what led to the volte face.  The 
government got its toe-hold on a reconsideration by producing the results of FBI 
fingerprint examiner proficiency tests, tests which they had theretofore kept secret, 
presumably because the results (in contrast to their usual claims) were not perfect.  
On the government’s tendency to keep empirical results secret if they do not like 
them, see D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Rationality, Research and Leviathan: 
Law Enforcement Sponsored Research and the Criminal Process,___ MICH. ST. DCL L. REV. 
___ (forthcoming 2003).  There was also reason to believe that the proficiency tests 
were so easy as to have little to do with the boundary problem.  At any rate, although 
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months later in Llera-Plaza II.  In that opinion, he says that he had 
gone too far in declaring that fingerprint identification witnesses 
should be treated merely as “Hines” witnesses, and so he reverses 
himself, declaring that in general fingerprint identification witnesses 
should be allowed to testify as they always have, while he encourages 
research to continue to provide a theoretical basis for such testimony.  
However, once again, he never describes the factual contours of the 
“task at hand” in the case, and never addresses in any organized way 
the boundary issue regarding a reliability threshold for fingerprint 
identification.  Toward the end of the process this apparently begins 
to dawn, for the last line of Llera Plaza II is: “At the upcoming trial, 
the presentation of expert fingerprint testimony by the government . 
. . will be subject to the court’s oversight prior to presentation of such 
testimony before the jury, with a view to insuring that . . . fingerprints 
offered in evidence will be of a quality arguably susceptible of 
responsible analysis, comparison and evaluation.”202  Why that was not 
the focus of the entire Daubert/Kumho Tire inquiry from the 
beginning, we will probably never know. 
If Llera Plaza II answered the trivial question and avoided the 
hard one by violating the strictures laid down by the Supreme Court 
in Kumho Tire, it has certainly been treated as disposing of all 
questions by subsequent courts facing fingerprint identification 
reliability challenges.  This dénouement was unfortunately 
predictable, given how much courts want to avoid such issues and 
seek even inapplicable precedents to use in this way.  The Llera Plaza 
debacle will probably delay appropriate judicial examination of the 
boundary problem of threshold reliability in regard to fingerprint 
identification applied to partial latent prints for a long time to come.  
Such are sometimes the costs of the judge’s failure to frame the 
question before the court with proper specificity. 
To give Judge Pollak his due, he at least attempted to take on a 
hard issue, and it is only fair to note that Judge Pollak is hardly alone 
in failing to frame the fingerprint reliability issue in the case before 
him with the specificity required by Kumho Tire.  Since the year 2000 
there have been a spate of challenges to the reliability of fingerprint 
identification raised in the federal courts, generating twenty-one 
opinions,203 and in not a single case has the court described the 
 
Judge Pollak was critical of them, they were good enough in the end to be a part of 
the basis for Judge Pollak’s self-reversal.  Id. at 565-66. 
 202 Llera Plaza II, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 576. 
 203 United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Navarro-
Fletes, 49 Fed. Appx. 732 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Hernandez, 299 F.3d 984 
(8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Ambriz-Vasquez, 34 Fed. Appx. 356 (9th Cir. 2002); 
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individual characteristics of the latent prints which were the subject 
of the challenge.  It is enough to make one feel sorry for the 
Supreme Court, so little has Kumho Tire been read with care by 
judges. 
CONCLUSION 
When it comes to prosecution-proffered expertise, the approach 
taken by courts in handwriting and fingerprint reliability tasks is not 
atypical.  A perusal of all the reported opinions in criminal cases 
since the decision in Kumho Tire reveals a predominance of 
inappropriately global examination, especially in regard to 
experience-based claims of expertise.  The Supreme Court has only 
itself to blame for this state of affairs.  First, while it is clear in context 
that references to “discretion” and “flexibility” were meant only to 
allow the intelligent selection of the most rationally appropriate 
criteria of reliability for a particular kind of expertise and its claims in 
relation to the particular facts of the case, they have been seized upon 
by the lower courts as a warrant to avoid hard tasks of framing and 
evaluation, at least in regard to prosecution proffers.204  No matter 
 
United States v. Turner, 285 F.3d 909 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Martinez-
Garduno, 31 Fed. Appx. 475 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Williams, 29 Fed. Appx. 
486 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Rogers, 26 Fed. Appx. 171 (4th Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Merritt, 
Cause No. IP01-0081-CR-01-T/F, 2002 WL 1821821 (S.D. Ind. June 26, 2002); United 
States v. Nadurath, No. 4:02-CR-32-A, 2002 WL 1000929 (N.D. Tex. May 14, 2002); 
United States v. Mitchell, 199 F. Supp. 2d 262 (E.D. Pa. 2002); United States v. Cruz-
Rivera, Crim. No. 00-98-01 (CCC), 2002 WL 662128 (D.P.R. Mar. 27, 2002); United 
States v. Salim, 189 F. Supp. 2d 93 (D. Kan. 2002); United States v. Cline, 188 F. 
Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Kan. 2002); United States v. Reaux, Crim. Action No. 01-071 
Section “R” (2), 2001 WL 883221 (E.D. La. July 31, 2001); United States v. Joseph, 
Crim. Action No. 99-238 Section “N,” 2001 WL 515213 (E.D. La. May 14, 2001); 
United States v. Martinez-Cintron, 136 F. Supp. 2d 17 (D.P.R. 2001); United States v. 
Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000); Unites States v. Cooper, 91 F. Supp. 
2d 79 (D.D.C. 2000).  These opinions are in addition to the two Llera Plaza decisions. 
 204 There is also reason to believe the that district courts have held criminal 
defendants’ proffers to a higher standard of threshold reliability than prosecution 
proffers.  See generally, Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability, supra note 3.  It is in some 
ways easy to account for this.  Absent unusual circumstances resulting in an 
interlocutory appeal, exclusion of prosecution proffers by the trial court is 
unreviewable, whereas exclusion of defense proffers, in the mind of the trial judge, 
can be corrected on appeal if erroneous.  It is easy to see how this can incline the 
trial judge toward admission.  See R. Erik Lilquist, A Comment on the Admissibility of 
Forensic Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1189, 1191-92 (2003).  However, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), 
mandating review of Rule 702 rulings only by an “abuse of discretion” standard, has 
resulted in virtual automatic affirmance by the courts of appeal, and created a 
situation where nobody takes responsibility for seriously evaluating the actual 
reliability of prosecution-proffered expertise. 
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how clear this may appear to the scholarly observer, however, it is not 
likely to change until the Supreme Court once again returns to this 
area to inform the lower courts that it actually meant what it said. 
 
